Added warnings to all key exchanges that do not provide protection against quantum attacks.

This commit is contained in:
Joe Testa
2024-11-25 15:56:51 -05:00
parent a01baadfa8
commit 28a1e23986
26 changed files with 475 additions and 162 deletions

View File

@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
"info": [
"default key exchange from OpenSSH 7.4 to 8.9",
"available since OpenSSH 7.4, Dropbear SSH 2018.76"
],
"warn": [
"does not provide protection against post-quantum attacks"
]
}
},
@ -93,6 +96,9 @@
"info": [
"default key exchange from OpenSSH 6.5 to 7.3",
"available since OpenSSH 6.4, Dropbear SSH 2013.62"
],
"warn": [
"does not provide protection against post-quantum attacks"
]
}
},
@ -103,6 +109,9 @@
"info": [
"OpenSSH's GEX fallback mechanism was triggered during testing. Very old SSH clients will still be able to create connections using a 2048-bit modulus, though modern clients will use 4096. This can only be disabled by recompiling the code (see https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_4/dh.c#L477).",
"available since OpenSSH 4.4"
],
"warn": [
"does not provide protection against post-quantum attacks"
]
}
}
@ -146,16 +155,6 @@
"recommendations": {
"informational": {
"add": {
"kex": [
{
"name": "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512",
"notes": ""
},
{
"name": "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512",
"notes": ""
}
],
"key": [
{
"name": "rsa-sha2-256",
@ -169,12 +168,30 @@
}
},
"warning": {
"chg": {
"kex": [
{
"name": "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256",
"notes": "increase modulus size to 3072 bits or larger"
}
]
},
"del": {
"enc": [
{
"name": "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
"notes": ""
}
],
"kex": [
{
"name": "curve25519-sha256",
"notes": ""
},
{
"name": "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",
"notes": ""
}
]
}
}