diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 971d91d..1365fdd 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ For convenience, a web front-end on top of the command-line tool is available at
 ### v3.2.0-dev (???)
  - Expanded filter of CBC ciphers to flag for the Terrapin vulnerability.  It now includes more rarely found ciphers.
  - Color output is disabled if the `NO_COLOR` environment variable is set (see https://no-color.org/).
+ - Fixed parsing of ecdsa-sha2-nistp* CA signatures on host keys.  Additionally, they are now flagged as potentially back-doored, just as standard host keys are.
 
 ### v3.1.0 (2023-12-20)
  - Added test for the Terrapin message prefix truncation vulnerability ([CVE-2023-48795](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-48795)).
diff --git a/src/ssh_audit/hostkeytest.py b/src/ssh_audit/hostkeytest.py
index 3628b7a..094b2b7 100644
--- a/src/ssh_audit/hostkeytest.py
+++ b/src/ssh_audit/hostkeytest.py
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ class HostKeyTest:
                         hostkey_min_good = 256
                         hostkey_min_warn = 224
                         hostkey_warn_str = HostKeyTest.SMALL_ECC_MODULUS_WARNING
-                    if ca_key_type.startswith('ssh-ed25519') or host_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
+                    if ca_key_type.startswith('ssh-ed25519') or ca_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
                         cakey_min_good = 256
                         cakey_min_warn = 224
                         cakey_warn_str = HostKeyTest.SMALL_ECC_MODULUS_WARNING
@@ -209,6 +209,10 @@ class HostKeyTest:
                         elif (0 < ca_modulus_size < cakey_min_good) and (cakey_warn_str not in key_warn_comments):
                             key_warn_comments.append(cakey_warn_str)
 
+                    # If the CA key type uses ECDSA with a NIST P-curve, fail it for possibly being back-doored.
+                    if ca_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
+                        key_fail_comments.append('CA key uses elliptic curves that are suspected as being backdoored by the U.S. National Security Agency')
+
                 # If this host key type is in the RSA family, then mark them all as parsed (since results in one are valid for them all).
                 if host_key_type in HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
                     for rsa_type in HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
diff --git a/src/ssh_audit/kexdh.py b/src/ssh_audit/kexdh.py
index 83cada2..85beb8e 100644
--- a/src/ssh_audit/kexdh.py
+++ b/src/ssh_audit/kexdh.py
@@ -212,6 +212,15 @@ class KexDH:  # pragma: nocover
                 # CA's modulus.  Bingo.
                 ca_key_n, ca_key_n_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)  # pylint: disable=unused-variable
 
+                if ca_key_type.startswith("ecdsa-sha2-nistp") and ca_key_n_len > 0:
+                    self.out.d("Found ecdsa-sha2-nistp* CA key type.")
+
+                    # 0x04 signifies that this is an uncompressed public key (meaning that full X and Y values are provided in ca_key_n.
+                    if ca_key_n[0] == 4:
+                        ca_key_n_len = ca_key_n_len - 1  # Subtract the 0x04 byte.
+                        ca_key_n_len = int(ca_key_n_len / 2)  # Divide by 2 since the modulus is the size of either the X or Y value.
+
+
         else:
             self.out.d("Certificate type %u found; this is not usually valid in the context of a host key!  Skipping it..." % cert_type)