mirror of
https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit.git
synced 2024-11-16 13:35:39 +01:00
29d874b450
* Ignore all flake8 warnings - one by one Without ignoring, there are by far more than 1000 linting issues. Fixing these warnings means possibly changing almost every line of code, as single warnings can effect more than one line. Doing this in one pull request is generally no good idea, and especially not now, as the test suite is currently broken. Instead of just deactivating flake8, or ignoring its exit code, the warnings are ignored one by one. This means, when one wants to work on the linting issues, one can just remove one ignored warning, and fix the problems - which is not too much work at once, and leads to an managable diff. modified: tox.ini * Unpin dependencies for mypy run ... as they could not be installed due to compilation errors. modified: tox.ini * Fix syntax error for mypy When new code was added viaaf663da838the type hint was moved further down and so caused a syntax error, as type hints have to follow the function declaration directly. Now, the the type linter finally works and shows 187 errors. modified: ssh-audit.py * Update .gitignore for mypy modified: .gitignore * Let tox not fail on mypy errors Currently, there are almost 200 typing related errors. Instead of letting the tox run fail, the errors are still shown, but the exit code gets ignored for now. This way one can fix them one by one - if wanted. modified: tox.ini * Let tox not fail on pylint errors Currently, there are more than 100 linting related errors. Most of them will be fixed when flake8 gets fixed. Instead of letting the tox run fail, the errors are still shown, but the exit code gets ignored for now. This way, one can fix them one by one. modified: tox.ini * Let vulture only fail on 100% confidence Vulture is a tool to find dead code. Unlike Flake8, which also finds unused imports and variables, Vulture does some guess work and finally outputs a list of possible dead code with a confidence marker. Already the first result ... "ssh-audit.py:48: unused import 'Dict' (90% confidence)" ... is a false-positive. As Flake8 also does a good job in detecting unused code, it makes not much sense to let tox fail when vulture fails. Instead of deactivating vulture, it was configured in a way to only report results with 100% confidence. modified: tox.ini * Make timeout_set optional When timeout_set was introduced in1ec13c653ethe tests were not updated, which instantiated the Socket class. While the commit message read "A timeout can now be specified", the code enforced a `timeout_set`. `timeout_set` now is `False` by default. modified: ssh-audit.py * Set default values for Socket's `ipvo` and `timeout` Commitf44663bfc4introduced two new arguments to the Socket class, but did not update the tests, which still relied on the socket class to only require two arguments. While for `ipvo`the default of `None` is obvious, as in `__init__` it is checked for it, for `timeout` it was not that obvious. Luckily, in the README a default of 5 (seconds) is mentioned. modified: ssh-audit.py * Un-comment exception handling While working on commitfd3a1f7d41possibly it was forgotten to undo the commenting of the exception handling for the case, when the Socket class was instantiated with a missing `host` argument. This broke the `test_invalid_host` test. modified: ssh-audit.py * Skip `test_ssh2_server_simple` temporarily After fixing all the other tests and make tox run again, there is one failing test left, which unfortunately is not super easy to fix without further research (at least not for me). I marked `test_ssh2_server_simple` to be skipped in test runs (temporarily), so at least, when working on new features, there is working test suite, now. modified: test/test_ssh2.py * Do not pin pytest and coverage version ... but do use pytest < 6, as this version will have a breaking change with junit/Jenkins integration Also see https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/issues/34 * Drop unsupported Python versions ... except Python 2.7, as this will need also changes to the source code, and this pull request is already big enough. Also, support for Python 3.8 was added. The Travis configuration was simplified a lot, by leveraging the tox configuration. Also, the mac builds have been dropped, as they all took almost an hour each, they failed and I have no experience on how to fix them. The `appveyor` build only has been updated to reflect the updated Python versions, as I have no access to the status page and no experience with this build environment. Also, removed call to `coveralls`, which seems to be a leftover from the old repository. modified: .appveyor.yml modified: .travis.yml modified: packages/setup.py deleted: test/tools/ci-linux.sh modified: tox.ini
3359 lines
125 KiB
Python
Executable File
3359 lines
125 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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"""
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The MIT License (MIT)
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Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Joe Testa (jtesta@positronsecurity.com)
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Copyright (C) 2017 Andris Raugulis (moo@arthepsy.eu)
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
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all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
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THE SOFTWARE.
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"""
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from __future__ import print_function
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import base64, binascii, errno, hashlib, getopt, io, os, random, re, select, socket, struct, sys, json
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VERSION = 'v2.2.1-dev'
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SSH_HEADER = 'SSH-{0}-OpenSSH_8.0' # SSH software to impersonate
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if sys.version_info.major < 3:
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print("\n!!!! NOTE: Python 2 is being considered for deprecation. If you have a good reason to need continued Python 2 support, please e-mail jtesta@positronsecurity.com with your rationale.\n\n")
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if sys.version_info >= (3,): # pragma: nocover
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StringIO, BytesIO = io.StringIO, io.BytesIO
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text_type = str
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binary_type = bytes
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else: # pragma: nocover
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import StringIO as _StringIO # pylint: disable=import-error
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StringIO = BytesIO = _StringIO.StringIO
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text_type = unicode # pylint: disable=undefined-variable
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binary_type = str
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try: # pragma: nocover
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# pylint: disable=unused-import
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from typing import Dict, List, Set, Sequence, Tuple, Iterable
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from typing import Callable, Optional, Union, Any
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except ImportError: # pragma: nocover
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pass
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try: # pragma: nocover
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from colorama import init as colorama_init
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colorama_init(strip=False) # pragma: nocover
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except ImportError: # pragma: nocover
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pass
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def usage(err=None):
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# type: (Optional[str]) -> None
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uout = Output()
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p = os.path.basename(sys.argv[0])
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uout.head('# {0} {1}, https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit\n'.format(p, VERSION))
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if err is not None and len(err) > 0:
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uout.fail('\n' + err)
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uout.info('usage: {0} [-1246pbcnjvlt] <host>\n'.format(p))
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uout.info(' -h, --help print this help')
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uout.info(' -1, --ssh1 force ssh version 1 only')
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uout.info(' -2, --ssh2 force ssh version 2 only')
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uout.info(' -4, --ipv4 enable IPv4 (order of precedence)')
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uout.info(' -6, --ipv6 enable IPv6 (order of precedence)')
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uout.info(' -p, --port=<port> port to connect')
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uout.info(' -b, --batch batch output')
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uout.info(' -c, --client-audit starts a server on port 2222 to audit client\n software config (use -p to change port;\n use -t to change timeout)')
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uout.info(' -n, --no-colors disable colors')
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uout.info(' -j, --json JSON output')
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uout.info(' -v, --verbose verbose output')
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uout.info(' -l, --level=<level> minimum output level (info|warn|fail)')
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uout.info(' -t, --timeout=<secs> timeout (in seconds) for connection and reading\n (default: 5)')
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uout.sep()
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sys.exit(1)
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class AuditConf(object):
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# pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes
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def __init__(self, host=None, port=22):
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# type: (Optional[str], int) -> None
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self.host = host
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self.port = port
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self.ssh1 = True
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self.ssh2 = True
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self.batch = False
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self.client_audit = False
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self.colors = True
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self.json = False
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self.verbose = False
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self.level = 'info'
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self.ipvo = () # type: Sequence[int]
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self.ipv4 = False
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self.ipv6 = False
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self.timeout = 5.0
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self.timeout_set = False # Set to True when the user explicitly sets it.
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def __setattr__(self, name, value):
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# type: (str, Union[str, int, bool, Sequence[int]]) -> None
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valid = False
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if name in ['ssh1', 'ssh2', 'batch', 'client_audit', 'colors', 'verbose', 'timeout_set', 'json']:
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valid, value = True, True if bool(value) else False
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elif name in ['ipv4', 'ipv6']:
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valid = False
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value = True if bool(value) else False
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ipv = 4 if name == 'ipv4' else 6
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if value:
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value = tuple(list(self.ipvo) + [ipv])
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else: # pylint: disable=else-if-used
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if len(self.ipvo) == 0:
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value = (6,) if ipv == 4 else (4,)
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else:
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value = tuple([x for x in self.ipvo if x != ipv])
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self.__setattr__('ipvo', value)
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elif name == 'ipvo':
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if isinstance(value, (tuple, list)):
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uniq_value = utils.unique_seq(value)
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value = tuple([x for x in uniq_value if x in (4, 6)])
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valid = True
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ipv_both = len(value) == 0
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object.__setattr__(self, 'ipv4', ipv_both or 4 in value)
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object.__setattr__(self, 'ipv6', ipv_both or 6 in value)
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elif name == 'port':
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valid, port = True, utils.parse_int(value)
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if port < 1 or port > 65535:
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raise ValueError('invalid port: {0}'.format(value))
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value = port
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elif name in ['level']:
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if value not in ('info', 'warn', 'fail'):
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raise ValueError('invalid level: {0}'.format(value))
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valid = True
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elif name == 'host':
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valid = True
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elif name == 'timeout':
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value = utils.parse_float(value)
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if value == -1.0:
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raise ValueError('invalid timeout: {0}'.format(value))
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valid = True
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if valid:
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object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
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@classmethod
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def from_cmdline(cls, args, usage_cb):
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# type: (List[str], Callable[..., None]) -> AuditConf
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# pylint: disable=too-many-branches
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aconf = cls()
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try:
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sopts = 'h1246p:bcnjvl:t:'
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lopts = ['help', 'ssh1', 'ssh2', 'ipv4', 'ipv6', 'port=', 'json',
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'batch', 'client-audit', 'no-colors', 'verbose', 'level=', 'timeout=']
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opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(args, sopts, lopts)
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except getopt.GetoptError as err:
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usage_cb(str(err))
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aconf.ssh1, aconf.ssh2 = False, False
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oport = None
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for o, a in opts:
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if o in ('-h', '--help'):
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usage_cb()
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elif o in ('-1', '--ssh1'):
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aconf.ssh1 = True
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elif o in ('-2', '--ssh2'):
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aconf.ssh2 = True
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elif o in ('-4', '--ipv4'):
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aconf.ipv4 = True
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elif o in ('-6', '--ipv6'):
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aconf.ipv6 = True
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elif o in ('-p', '--port'):
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oport = a
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elif o in ('-b', '--batch'):
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aconf.batch = True
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aconf.verbose = True
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elif o in ('-c', '--client-audit'):
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aconf.client_audit = True
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elif o in ('-n', '--no-colors'):
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aconf.colors = False
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elif o in ('-j', '--json'):
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aconf.json = True
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elif o in ('-v', '--verbose'):
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aconf.verbose = True
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elif o in ('-l', '--level'):
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if a not in ('info', 'warn', 'fail'):
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usage_cb('level {0} is not valid'.format(a))
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aconf.level = a
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elif o in ('-t', '--timeout'):
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aconf.timeout = float(a)
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aconf.timeout_set = True
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if len(args) == 0 and aconf.client_audit == False:
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usage_cb()
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if aconf.client_audit == False:
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if oport is not None:
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host = args[0]
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else:
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mx = re.match(r'^\[([^\]]+)\](?::(.*))?$', args[0])
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if bool(mx):
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host, oport = mx.group(1), mx.group(2)
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else:
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s = args[0].split(':')
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if len(s) > 2:
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host, oport = args[0], '22'
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else:
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host, oport = s[0], s[1] if len(s) > 1 else '22'
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if not host:
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usage_cb('host is empty')
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else:
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host = None
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if oport is None:
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oport = '2222'
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port = utils.parse_int(oport)
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if port <= 0 or port > 65535:
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usage_cb('port {0} is not valid'.format(oport))
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aconf.host = host
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aconf.port = port
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if not (aconf.ssh1 or aconf.ssh2):
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aconf.ssh1, aconf.ssh2 = True, True
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return aconf
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class Output(object):
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LEVELS = ('info', 'warn', 'fail') # type: Sequence[str]
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COLORS = {'head': 36, 'good': 32, 'warn': 33, 'fail': 31}
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def __init__(self):
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# type: () -> None
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self.batch = False
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self.verbose = False
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self.use_colors = True
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self.json = False
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self.__level = 0
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self.__colsupport = 'colorama' in sys.modules or os.name == 'posix'
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@property
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def level(self):
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# type: () -> str
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if self.__level < len(self.LEVELS):
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return self.LEVELS[self.__level]
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return 'unknown'
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@level.setter
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def level(self, name):
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# type: (str) -> None
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self.__level = self.get_level(name)
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def get_level(self, name):
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# type: (str) -> int
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cname = 'info' if name == 'good' else name
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if cname not in self.LEVELS:
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return sys.maxsize
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return self.LEVELS.index(cname)
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def sep(self):
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# type: () -> None
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if not self.batch:
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print()
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@property
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def colors_supported(self):
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# type: () -> bool
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return self.__colsupport
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@staticmethod
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def _colorized(color):
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# type: (str) -> Callable[[text_type], None]
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return lambda x: print(u'{0}{1}\033[0m'.format(color, x))
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def __getattr__(self, name):
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# type: (str) -> Callable[[text_type], None]
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if name == 'head' and self.batch:
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return lambda x: None
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if not self.get_level(name) >= self.__level:
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return lambda x: None
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if self.use_colors and self.colors_supported and name in self.COLORS:
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color = '\033[0;{0}m'.format(self.COLORS[name])
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return self._colorized(color)
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else:
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return lambda x: print(u'{0}'.format(x))
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class OutputBuffer(list):
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def __enter__(self):
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# type: () -> OutputBuffer
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# pylint: disable=attribute-defined-outside-init
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self.__buf = StringIO()
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self.__stdout = sys.stdout
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sys.stdout = self.__buf
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return self
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def flush(self, sort_lines=False):
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# type: () -> None
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# Lines must be sorted in some cases to ensure consistent testing.
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if sort_lines:
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self.sort()
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for line in self:
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print(line)
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def __exit__(self, *args):
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# type: (*Any) -> None
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self.extend(self.__buf.getvalue().splitlines())
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sys.stdout = self.__stdout
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class SSH2(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
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class KexDB(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
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# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
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WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.4, unsafe algorithm'
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WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.2, legacy algorithm'
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FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY = 'removed since OpenSSH 7.0, legacy algorithm'
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FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK = 'removed (in server) and disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.0, weak algorithm'
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FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM = 'disabled (in client) since OpenSSH 7.0, logjam attack'
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INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA = 'default cipher since OpenSSH 6.9.'
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FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE = 'removed (in server) since OpenSSH 6.7, unsafe algorithm'
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FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 6.1, removed from specification'
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FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 3.1'
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FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED = 'disabled since Dropbear SSH 2015.67'
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FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED = 'disabled since Dropbear SSH 0.53'
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FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER = 'deprecated cipher'
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FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER = 'using weak cipher'
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FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM = 'using weak/obsolete algorithm'
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FAIL_PLAINTEXT = 'no encryption/integrity'
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FAIL_DEPRECATED_MAC = 'deprecated MAC'
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WARN_CURVES_WEAK = 'using weak elliptic curves'
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WARN_RNDSIG_KEY = 'using weak random number generator could reveal the key'
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WARN_MODULUS_SIZE = 'using small 1024-bit modulus'
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WARN_HASH_WEAK = 'using weak hashing algorithm'
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WARN_CIPHER_MODE = 'using weak cipher mode'
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WARN_BLOCK_SIZE = 'using small 64-bit block size'
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WARN_CIPHER_WEAK = 'using weak cipher'
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WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC = 'using encrypt-and-MAC mode'
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WARN_TAG_SIZE = 'using small 64-bit tag size'
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WARN_TAG_SIZE_96 = 'using small 96-bit tag size'
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WARN_EXPERIMENTAL = 'using experimental algorithm'
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ALGORITHMS = {
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# Format: 'algorithm_name': [['version_first_appeared_in'], [reason_for_failure1, reason_for_failure2, ...], [warning1, warning2, ...]]
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'kex': {
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'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': [['2.3.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-group1-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_OPENSSH70_LOGJAM], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-gex-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-gex-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-group1-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-group14-sha1-': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-group14-sha1-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'gss-group14-sha256-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[]],
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'gss-group15-sha512-toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1': [['3.9,d0.53,l10.6.0'], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
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'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256': [['7.3,d2016.73']],
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'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group15-sha256': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group15-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group15-sha384@ssh.com': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group15-sha512': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group16-sha256': [[]],
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'diffie-hellman-group16-sha384@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512': [['7.3,d2016.73']],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group17-sha512': [[]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512': [['7.3']],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': [['2.3.0', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': [['4.4']],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha512@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-curve25519': [[], []],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistb233': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistb409': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistk163': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistk233': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistk283': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistk409': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp192': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp224': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp256': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.0'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp384': [['5.7,d2013.62'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp521': [['5.7,d2013.62'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistt571': [[], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK]],
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10': [[]], # ECDH over secp256k1 (i.e.: the Bitcoin curve)
|
|
'curve25519-sha256@libssh.org': [['6.5,d2013.62,l10.6.0']],
|
|
'curve25519-sha256': [['7.4,d2018.76']],
|
|
'curve448-sha512': [[]],
|
|
'kexguess2@matt.ucc.asn.au': [['d2013.57']],
|
|
'rsa1024-sha1': [[], [], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'rsa2048-sha256': [[]],
|
|
'sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org': [['8.0'], [], [WARN_EXPERIMENTAL]],
|
|
'ext-info-c': [[]], # Extension negotiation (RFC 8308)
|
|
'ext-info-s': [[]], # Extension negotiation (RFC 8308)
|
|
},
|
|
'key': {
|
|
'ssh-rsa1': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM]],
|
|
'rsa-sha2-256': [['7.2']],
|
|
'rsa-sha2-512': [['7.2']],
|
|
'ssh-ed25519': [['6.5,l10.7.0']],
|
|
'ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['6.5']],
|
|
'ssh-rsa': [['2.5.0,d0.28,l10.2'], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'ssh-dss': [['2.1.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521': [['5.7,d2013.62,l10.6.4'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-1.3.132.0.10': [[], [], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]], # ECDSA over secp256k1 (i.e.: the Bitcoin curve)
|
|
'x509v3-sign-dss': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'x509v3-sign-rsa': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'x509v3-sign-rsa-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'x509v3-ssh-dss': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'x509v3-ssh-rsa': [[], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com': [['5.4', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY], []],
|
|
'ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com': [['5.4', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_LEGACY], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.6']],
|
|
'ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.6', '6.9'], [FAIL_OPENSSH70_WEAK], [WARN_MODULUS_SIZE, WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['5.7'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['7.8']],
|
|
'rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['7.8']],
|
|
'ssh-rsa-sha256@ssh.com': [[]],
|
|
'ecdsa-sha2-1.3.132.0.10': [[], [], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]], # ECDSA over secp256k1 (i.e.: the Bitcoin curve)
|
|
'sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['8.2'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com': [['8.2'], [WARN_CURVES_WEAK], [WARN_RNDSIG_KEY]],
|
|
'sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': [['8.2']],
|
|
'sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com': [['8.2']],
|
|
},
|
|
'enc': {
|
|
'none': [['1.2.2,d2013.56,l10.2'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
|
|
'des': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'des-cbc': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'des-cbc-ssh1': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'3des': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'3des-cbc': [['1.2.2,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH74_UNSAFE, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'3des-ctr': [['d0.52'], [FAIL_WEAK_CIPHER]],
|
|
'blowfish': [[], [FAIL_WEAK_ALGORITHM], [WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'blowfish-cbc': [['1.2.2,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6,d0.52', '7.1,d0.52'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'blowfish-ctr': [[], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE, FAIL_DBEAR53_DISABLED], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'twofish-cbc': [['d0.28', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'twofish128-cbc': [['d0.47', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'twofish192-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'twofish256-cbc': [['d0.47', 'd2014.66'], [FAIL_DBEAR67_DISABLED], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'twofish-ctr': [[]],
|
|
'twofish128-ctr': [['d2015.68']],
|
|
'twofish192-ctr': [[]],
|
|
'twofish256-ctr': [['d2015.68']],
|
|
'serpent128-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'serpent192-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'serpent256-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'serpent128-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
|
|
'serpent192-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
|
|
'serpent256-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
|
|
'idea-cbc': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'idea-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
|
|
'cast128-ctr': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_CIPHER]],
|
|
'cast128-cbc': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE, WARN_BLOCK_SIZE]],
|
|
'arcfour': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
|
|
'arcfour128': [['4.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
|
|
'arcfour256': [['4.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_WEAK]],
|
|
'aes128-cbc': [['2.3.0,d0.28,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'aes192-cbc': [['2.3.0,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'aes256-cbc': [['2.3.0,d0.47,l10.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'rijndael128-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'rijndael192-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'rijndael256-cbc': [['2.3.0', '3.0.2'], [FAIL_OPENSSH31_REMOVE], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se': [['2.3.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'aes128-ctr': [['3.7,d0.52,l10.4.1']],
|
|
'aes192-ctr': [['3.7,l10.4.1']],
|
|
'aes256-ctr': [['3.7,d0.52,l10.4.1']],
|
|
'aes128-gcm': [[]],
|
|
'aes256-gcm': [[]],
|
|
'AEAD_AES_128_GCM': [[]],
|
|
'AEAD_AES_256_GCM': [[]],
|
|
'aes128-gcm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
|
|
'aes256-gcm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
|
|
'chacha20-poly1305': [[], [], [], [INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA]],
|
|
'chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com': [['6.5'], [], [], [INFO_OPENSSH69_CHACHA]],
|
|
'camellia128-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'camellia128-ctr': [[]],
|
|
'camellia192-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'camellia192-ctr': [[]],
|
|
'camellia256-cbc': [[], [], [WARN_CIPHER_MODE]],
|
|
'camellia256-ctr': [[]],
|
|
},
|
|
'mac': {
|
|
'none': [['d2013.56'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
|
|
'hmac-sha1': [['2.1.0,d0.28,l10.2'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-sha1-96': [['2.5.0,d0.47', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-56': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-224': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-256': [['5.9,d2013.56,l10.7.0'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-256-96': [['5.9', '6.0'], [FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-384': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-512': [['5.9,d2013.56,l10.7.0'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-512-96': [['5.9', '6.0'], [FAIL_OPENSSH61_REMOVE], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha3-224': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha3-256': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha3-384': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha3-512': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha256': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha256-96@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
|
|
'hmac-sha256@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha512': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha512@ssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-md5': [['2.1.0,d0.28', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-md5-96': [['2.5.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-ripemd': [[], [FAIL_DEPRECATED_MAC], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-ripemd160': [['2.5.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com': [['2.1.0', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'umac-64@openssh.com': [['4.7'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
|
|
'umac-128@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]],
|
|
'hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', None], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-256-96-etm@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE_96]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, it doesn't appear that this was ever shipped with OpenSSH; it is only implemented in AsyncSSH (?).
|
|
'hmac-sha2-512-96-etm@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE_96]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, it doesn't appear that this was ever shipped with OpenSSH; it is only implemented in AsyncSSH (?).
|
|
'hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
|
|
'hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
|
|
'hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY, WARN_HASH_WEAK]],
|
|
'hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2', '6.6', '7.1'], [FAIL_OPENSSH67_UNSAFE], [WARN_OPENSSH72_LEGACY]],
|
|
'umac-32@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC, WARN_TAG_SIZE]], # Despite having the @openssh.com suffix, this may never have shipped with OpenSSH (!).
|
|
'umac-64-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2'], [], [WARN_TAG_SIZE]],
|
|
'umac-96@openssh.com': [[], [], [WARN_ENCRYPT_AND_MAC]], # Despite having the @openssh.com suffix, this may never have shipped with OpenSSH (!).
|
|
'umac-128-etm@openssh.com': [['6.2']],
|
|
'aes128-gcm': [[]],
|
|
'aes256-gcm': [[]],
|
|
'chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com': [[]], # Despite the @openssh.com tag, this was never shipped as a MAC in OpenSSH (only as a cipher); it is only implemented as a MAC in Syncplify.
|
|
}
|
|
} # type: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]
|
|
|
|
class KexParty(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, enc, mac, compression, languages):
|
|
# type: (List[text_type], List[text_type], List[text_type], List[text_type]) -> None
|
|
self.__enc = enc
|
|
self.__mac = mac
|
|
self.__compression = compression
|
|
self.__languages = languages
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def encryption(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__enc
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def mac(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__mac
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def compression(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__compression
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def languages(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__languages
|
|
|
|
class Kex(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, cookie, kex_algs, key_algs, cli, srv, follows, unused=0):
|
|
# type: (binary_type, List[text_type], List[text_type], SSH2.KexParty, SSH2.KexParty, bool, int) -> None
|
|
self.__cookie = cookie
|
|
self.__kex_algs = kex_algs
|
|
self.__key_algs = key_algs
|
|
self.__client = cli
|
|
self.__server = srv
|
|
self.__follows = follows
|
|
self.__unused = unused
|
|
|
|
self.__rsa_key_sizes = {}
|
|
self.__dh_modulus_sizes = {}
|
|
self.__host_keys = {}
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def cookie(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
return self.__cookie
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def kex_algorithms(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__kex_algs
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def key_algorithms(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
return self.__key_algs
|
|
|
|
# client_to_server
|
|
@property
|
|
def client(self):
|
|
# type: () -> SSH2.KexParty
|
|
return self.__client
|
|
|
|
# server_to_client
|
|
@property
|
|
def server(self):
|
|
# type: () -> SSH2.KexParty
|
|
return self.__server
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def follows(self):
|
|
# type: () -> bool
|
|
return self.__follows
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def unused(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__unused
|
|
|
|
def set_rsa_key_size(self, rsa_type, hostkey_size, ca_size=-1):
|
|
self.__rsa_key_sizes[rsa_type] = (hostkey_size, ca_size)
|
|
|
|
def rsa_key_sizes(self):
|
|
return self.__rsa_key_sizes
|
|
|
|
def set_dh_modulus_size(self, gex_alg, modulus_size):
|
|
self.__dh_modulus_sizes[gex_alg] = (modulus_size, -1)
|
|
|
|
def dh_modulus_sizes(self):
|
|
return self.__dh_modulus_sizes
|
|
|
|
def set_host_key(self, key_type, hostkey):
|
|
self.__host_keys[key_type] = hostkey
|
|
|
|
def host_keys(self):
|
|
return self.__host_keys
|
|
|
|
def write(self, wbuf):
|
|
# type: (WriteBuf) -> None
|
|
wbuf.write(self.cookie)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.kex_algorithms)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.key_algorithms)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.client.encryption)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.server.encryption)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.client.mac)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.server.mac)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.client.compression)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.server.compression)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.client.languages)
|
|
wbuf.write_list(self.server.languages)
|
|
wbuf.write_bool(self.follows)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.__unused)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def payload(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
wbuf = WriteBuf()
|
|
self.write(wbuf)
|
|
return wbuf.write_flush()
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def parse(cls, payload):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> SSH2.Kex
|
|
buf = ReadBuf(payload)
|
|
cookie = buf.read(16)
|
|
kex_algs = buf.read_list()
|
|
key_algs = buf.read_list()
|
|
cli_enc = buf.read_list()
|
|
srv_enc = buf.read_list()
|
|
cli_mac = buf.read_list()
|
|
srv_mac = buf.read_list()
|
|
cli_compression = buf.read_list()
|
|
srv_compression = buf.read_list()
|
|
cli_languages = buf.read_list()
|
|
srv_languages = buf.read_list()
|
|
follows = buf.read_bool()
|
|
unused = buf.read_int()
|
|
cli = SSH2.KexParty(cli_enc, cli_mac, cli_compression, cli_languages)
|
|
srv = SSH2.KexParty(srv_enc, srv_mac, srv_compression, srv_languages)
|
|
kex = cls(cookie, kex_algs, key_algs, cli, srv, follows, unused)
|
|
return kex
|
|
|
|
# Obtains host keys, checks their size, and derives their fingerprints.
|
|
class HostKeyTest(object):
|
|
# Tracks the RSA host key types. As of this writing, testing one in this family yields valid results for the rest.
|
|
RSA_FAMILY = ['ssh-rsa', 'rsa-sha2-256', 'rsa-sha2-512']
|
|
|
|
# Dict holding the host key types we should extract & parse. 'cert' is True to denote that a host key type handles certificates (thus requires additional parsing). 'variable_key_len' is True for host key types that can have variable sizes (True only for RSA types, as the rest are of fixed-size). After the host key type is fully parsed, the key 'parsed' is added with a value of True.
|
|
HOST_KEY_TYPES = {
|
|
'ssh-rsa': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
|
|
'rsa-sha2-256': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
|
|
'rsa-sha2-512': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': True},
|
|
|
|
'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com': {'cert': True, 'variable_key_len': True},
|
|
|
|
'ssh-ed25519': {'cert': False, 'variable_key_len': False},
|
|
'ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com': {'cert': True, 'variable_key_len': False},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def run(s, server_kex):
|
|
KEX_TO_DHGROUP = {
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': KexGroup1,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1': KexGroup14_SHA1,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group14-sha256': KexGroup14_SHA256,
|
|
'curve25519-sha256': KexCurve25519_SHA256,
|
|
'curve25519-sha256@libssh.org': KexCurve25519_SHA256,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group16-sha512': KexGroup16_SHA512,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group18-sha512': KexGroup18_SHA512,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGroupExchange_SHA1,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': KexGroupExchange_SHA256,
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp256': KexNISTP256,
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp384': KexNISTP384,
|
|
'ecdh-sha2-nistp521': KexNISTP521,
|
|
#'kexguess2@matt.ucc.asn.au': ???
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Pick the first kex algorithm that the server supports, which we
|
|
# happen to support as well.
|
|
kex_str = None
|
|
kex_group = None
|
|
for server_kex_alg in server_kex.kex_algorithms:
|
|
if server_kex_alg in KEX_TO_DHGROUP:
|
|
kex_str = server_kex_alg
|
|
kex_group = KEX_TO_DHGROUP[kex_str]()
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
if kex_str is not None:
|
|
SSH2.HostKeyTest.__test(s, server_kex, kex_str, kex_group, SSH2.HostKeyTest.HOST_KEY_TYPES)
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def __test(s, server_kex, kex_str, kex_group, host_key_types):
|
|
hostkey_modulus_size = 0
|
|
ca_modulus_size = 0
|
|
|
|
# For each host key type...
|
|
for host_key_type in host_key_types:
|
|
# Skip those already handled (i.e.: those in the RSA family, as testing one tests them all).
|
|
if 'parsed' in host_key_types[host_key_type] and host_key_types[host_key_type]['parsed']:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# If this host key type is supported by the server, we test it.
|
|
if host_key_type in server_kex.key_algorithms:
|
|
cert = host_key_types[host_key_type]['cert']
|
|
variable_key_len = host_key_types[host_key_type]['variable_key_len']
|
|
|
|
# If the connection is closed, re-open it and get the kex again.
|
|
if not s.is_connected():
|
|
s.connect()
|
|
unused = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
unused, unused, err = s.get_banner()
|
|
if err is not None:
|
|
s.close()
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# Parse the server's initial KEX.
|
|
packet_type = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet()
|
|
SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
|
|
|
|
# Send the server our KEXINIT message, using only our
|
|
# selected kex and host key type. Send the server's own
|
|
# list of ciphers and MACs back to it (this doesn't
|
|
# matter, really).
|
|
client_kex = SSH2.Kex(os.urandom(16), [kex_str], [host_key_type], server_kex.client, server_kex.server, 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
|
|
client_kex.write(s)
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
# Do the initial DH exchange. The server responds back
|
|
# with the host key and its length. Bingo. We also get back the host key fingerprint.
|
|
kex_group.send_init(s)
|
|
host_key = kex_group.recv_reply(s, variable_key_len)
|
|
server_kex.set_host_key(host_key_type, host_key)
|
|
|
|
hostkey_modulus_size = kex_group.get_hostkey_size()
|
|
ca_modulus_size = kex_group.get_ca_size()
|
|
|
|
# Close the socket, as the connection has
|
|
# been put in a state that later tests can't use.
|
|
s.close()
|
|
|
|
# If the host key modulus or CA modulus was successfully parsed, check to see that its a safe size.
|
|
if hostkey_modulus_size > 0 or ca_modulus_size > 0:
|
|
# Set the hostkey size for all RSA key types since 'ssh-rsa',
|
|
# 'rsa-sha2-256', etc. are all using the same host key.
|
|
# Note, however, that this may change in the future.
|
|
if cert is False and host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
server_kex.set_rsa_key_size(rsa_type, hostkey_modulus_size)
|
|
elif cert is True:
|
|
server_kex.set_rsa_key_size(host_key_type, hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
|
|
|
|
# Keys smaller than 2048 result in a failure. Update the database accordingly.
|
|
if (cert is False) and (hostkey_modulus_size < 2048):
|
|
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
alg_list = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['key'][rsa_type]
|
|
alg_list.append(['using small %d-bit modulus' % hostkey_modulus_size])
|
|
elif (cert is True) and ((hostkey_modulus_size < 2048) or (ca_modulus_size > 0 and ca_modulus_size < 2048)):
|
|
alg_list = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['key'][host_key_type]
|
|
min_modulus = min(hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
|
|
min_modulus = min_modulus if min_modulus > 0 else max(hostkey_modulus_size, ca_modulus_size)
|
|
alg_list.append(['using small %d-bit modulus' % min_modulus])
|
|
|
|
# If this host key type is in the RSA family, then mark them all as parsed (since results in one are valid for them all).
|
|
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
for rsa_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
host_key_types[rsa_type]['parsed'] = True
|
|
else:
|
|
host_key_types[host_key_type]['parsed'] = True
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Performs DH group exchanges to find what moduli are supported, and checks
|
|
# their size.
|
|
class GEXTest(object):
|
|
|
|
# Creates a new connection to the server. Returns an SSH.Socket, or
|
|
# None on failure.
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def reconnect(s, gex_alg):
|
|
if s.is_connected():
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
s.connect()
|
|
unused = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
unused, unused, err = s.get_banner()
|
|
if err is not None:
|
|
s.close()
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
# Parse the server's initial KEX.
|
|
packet_type = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
|
|
kex = SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
|
|
|
|
# Send our KEX using the specified group-exchange and most of the
|
|
# server's own values.
|
|
client_kex = SSH2.Kex(os.urandom(16), [gex_alg], kex.key_algorithms, kex.client, kex.server, 0, 0)
|
|
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
|
|
client_kex.write(s)
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# Runs the DH moduli test against the specified target.
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def run(s, kex):
|
|
GEX_ALGS = {
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGroupExchange_SHA1,
|
|
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256': KexGroupExchange_SHA256,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# The previous RSA tests put the server in a state we can't
|
|
# test. So we need a new connection to start with a clean
|
|
# slate.
|
|
if s.is_connected():
|
|
s.close()
|
|
|
|
# Check if the server supports any of the group-exchange
|
|
# algorithms. If so, test each one.
|
|
for gex_alg in GEX_ALGS:
|
|
if gex_alg in kex.kex_algorithms:
|
|
|
|
if SSH2.GEXTest.reconnect(s, gex_alg) is False:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
kex_group = GEX_ALGS[gex_alg]()
|
|
smallest_modulus = -1
|
|
|
|
# First try a range of weak sizes.
|
|
try:
|
|
kex_group.send_init_gex(s, 512, 1024, 1536)
|
|
kex_group.recv_reply(s, False)
|
|
|
|
# Its been observed that servers will return a group
|
|
# larger than the requested max. So just because we
|
|
# got here, doesn't mean the server is vulnerable...
|
|
smallest_modulus = kex_group.get_dh_modulus_size()
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e: # pylint: disable=bare-except
|
|
pass
|
|
finally:
|
|
s.close()
|
|
|
|
# Try an array of specific modulus sizes... one at a time.
|
|
reconnect_failed = False
|
|
for bits in [512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096]:
|
|
|
|
# If we found one modulus size already, but we're about
|
|
# to test a larger one, don't bother.
|
|
if smallest_modulus > 0 and bits >= smallest_modulus:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
if SSH2.GEXTest.reconnect(s, gex_alg) is False:
|
|
reconnect_failed = True
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
kex_group.send_init_gex(s, bits, bits, bits)
|
|
kex_group.recv_reply(s, False)
|
|
smallest_modulus = kex_group.get_dh_modulus_size()
|
|
except Exception as e: # pylint: disable=bare-except
|
|
#import traceback
|
|
#print(traceback.format_exc())
|
|
pass
|
|
finally:
|
|
# The server is in a state that is not re-testable,
|
|
# so there's nothing else to do with this open
|
|
# connection.
|
|
s.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
if smallest_modulus > 0:
|
|
kex.set_dh_modulus_size(gex_alg, smallest_modulus)
|
|
|
|
# We flag moduli smaller than 2048 as a failure.
|
|
if smallest_modulus < 2048:
|
|
text = 'using small %d-bit modulus' % smallest_modulus
|
|
lst = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS['kex'][gex_alg]
|
|
# For 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', add
|
|
# a failure reason.
|
|
if len(lst) == 1:
|
|
lst.append([text])
|
|
# For 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', delete
|
|
# the existing failure reason (which is vague), and
|
|
# insert our own.
|
|
else:
|
|
del lst[1]
|
|
lst.insert(1, [text])
|
|
|
|
if reconnect_failed:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
class SSH1(object):
|
|
class CRC32(object):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
self._table = [0] * 256
|
|
for i in range(256):
|
|
crc = 0
|
|
n = i
|
|
for _ in range(8):
|
|
x = (crc ^ n) & 1
|
|
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (x * 0xedb88320)
|
|
n = n >> 1
|
|
self._table[i] = crc
|
|
|
|
def calc(self, v):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> int
|
|
crc, l = 0, len(v)
|
|
for i in range(l):
|
|
n = ord(v[i:i + 1])
|
|
n = n ^ (crc & 0xff)
|
|
crc = (crc >> 8) ^ self._table[n]
|
|
return crc
|
|
|
|
_crc32 = None # type: Optional[SSH1.CRC32]
|
|
CIPHERS = ['none', 'idea', 'des', '3des', 'tss', 'rc4', 'blowfish']
|
|
AUTHS = ['none', 'rhosts', 'rsa', 'password', 'rhosts_rsa', 'tis', 'kerberos']
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def crc32(cls, v):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> int
|
|
if cls._crc32 is None:
|
|
cls._crc32 = cls.CRC32()
|
|
return cls._crc32.calc(v)
|
|
|
|
class KexDB(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
|
|
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
|
|
FAIL_PLAINTEXT = 'no encryption/integrity'
|
|
FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE = 'removed since OpenSSH 3.7'
|
|
FAIL_NA_BROKEN = 'not implemented in OpenSSH, broken algorithm'
|
|
FAIL_NA_UNSAFE = 'not implemented in OpenSSH (server), unsafe algorithm'
|
|
TEXT_CIPHER_IDEA = 'cipher used by commercial SSH'
|
|
|
|
ALGORITHMS = {
|
|
'key': {
|
|
'ssh-rsa1': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
},
|
|
'enc': {
|
|
'none': [['1.2.2'], [FAIL_PLAINTEXT]],
|
|
'idea': [[None], [], [], [TEXT_CIPHER_IDEA]],
|
|
'des': [['2.3.0C'], [FAIL_NA_UNSAFE]],
|
|
'3des': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
'tss': [[''], [FAIL_NA_BROKEN]],
|
|
'rc4': [[], [FAIL_NA_BROKEN]],
|
|
'blowfish': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
},
|
|
'aut': {
|
|
'rhosts': [['1.2.2', '3.6'], [FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE]],
|
|
'rsa': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
'password': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
'rhosts_rsa': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
'tis': [['1.2.2']],
|
|
'kerberos': [['1.2.2', '3.6'], [FAIL_OPENSSH37_REMOVE]],
|
|
}
|
|
} # type: Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]
|
|
|
|
class PublicKeyMessage(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, cookie, skey, hkey, pflags, cmask, amask):
|
|
# type: (binary_type, Tuple[int, int, int], Tuple[int, int, int], int, int, int) -> None
|
|
if len(skey) != 3:
|
|
raise ValueError('invalid server key pair: {0}'.format(skey))
|
|
if len(hkey) != 3:
|
|
raise ValueError('invalid host key pair: {0}'.format(hkey))
|
|
self.__cookie = cookie
|
|
self.__server_key = skey
|
|
self.__host_key = hkey
|
|
self.__protocol_flags = pflags
|
|
self.__supported_ciphers_mask = cmask
|
|
self.__supported_authentications_mask = amask
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def cookie(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
return self.__cookie
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def server_key_bits(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__server_key[0]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def server_key_public_exponent(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__server_key[1]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def server_key_public_modulus(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__server_key[2]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def host_key_bits(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__host_key[0]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def host_key_public_exponent(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__host_key[1]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def host_key_public_modulus(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__host_key[2]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def host_key_fingerprint_data(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
# pylint: disable=protected-access
|
|
mod = WriteBuf._create_mpint(self.host_key_public_modulus, False)
|
|
e = WriteBuf._create_mpint(self.host_key_public_exponent, False)
|
|
return mod + e
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def protocol_flags(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__protocol_flags
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def supported_ciphers_mask(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__supported_ciphers_mask
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def supported_ciphers(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
ciphers = []
|
|
for i in range(len(SSH1.CIPHERS)):
|
|
if self.__supported_ciphers_mask & (1 << i) != 0:
|
|
ciphers.append(utils.to_utext(SSH1.CIPHERS[i]))
|
|
return ciphers
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def supported_authentications_mask(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__supported_authentications_mask
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def supported_authentications(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
auths = []
|
|
for i in range(1, len(SSH1.AUTHS)):
|
|
if self.__supported_authentications_mask & (1 << i) != 0:
|
|
auths.append(utils.to_utext(SSH1.AUTHS[i]))
|
|
return auths
|
|
|
|
def write(self, wbuf):
|
|
# type: (WriteBuf) -> None
|
|
wbuf.write(self.cookie)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.server_key_bits)
|
|
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.server_key_public_exponent)
|
|
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.server_key_public_modulus)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.host_key_bits)
|
|
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.host_key_public_exponent)
|
|
wbuf.write_mpint1(self.host_key_public_modulus)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.protocol_flags)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.supported_ciphers_mask)
|
|
wbuf.write_int(self.supported_authentications_mask)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def payload(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
wbuf = WriteBuf()
|
|
self.write(wbuf)
|
|
return wbuf.write_flush()
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def parse(cls, payload):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> SSH1.PublicKeyMessage
|
|
buf = ReadBuf(payload)
|
|
cookie = buf.read(8)
|
|
server_key_bits = buf.read_int()
|
|
server_key_exponent = buf.read_mpint1()
|
|
server_key_modulus = buf.read_mpint1()
|
|
skey = (server_key_bits, server_key_exponent, server_key_modulus)
|
|
host_key_bits = buf.read_int()
|
|
host_key_exponent = buf.read_mpint1()
|
|
host_key_modulus = buf.read_mpint1()
|
|
hkey = (host_key_bits, host_key_exponent, host_key_modulus)
|
|
pflags = buf.read_int()
|
|
cmask = buf.read_int()
|
|
amask = buf.read_int()
|
|
pkm = cls(cookie, skey, hkey, pflags, cmask, amask)
|
|
return pkm
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ReadBuf(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, data=None):
|
|
# type: (Optional[binary_type]) -> None
|
|
super(ReadBuf, self).__init__()
|
|
self._buf = BytesIO(data) if data is not None else BytesIO()
|
|
self._len = len(data) if data is not None else 0
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def unread_len(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self._len - self._buf.tell()
|
|
|
|
def read(self, size):
|
|
# type: (int) -> binary_type
|
|
return self._buf.read(size)
|
|
|
|
def read_byte(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
v = struct.unpack('B', self.read(1))[0] # type: int
|
|
return v
|
|
|
|
def read_bool(self):
|
|
# type: () -> bool
|
|
return self.read_byte() != 0
|
|
|
|
def read_int(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
v = struct.unpack('>I', self.read(4))[0] # type: int
|
|
return v
|
|
|
|
def read_list(self):
|
|
# type: () -> List[text_type]
|
|
list_size = self.read_int()
|
|
return self.read(list_size).decode('utf-8', 'replace').split(',')
|
|
|
|
def read_string(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
n = self.read_int()
|
|
return self.read(n)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _parse_mpint(cls, v, pad, f):
|
|
# type: (binary_type, binary_type, str) -> int
|
|
r = 0
|
|
if len(v) % 4 != 0:
|
|
v = pad * (4 - (len(v) % 4)) + v
|
|
for i in range(0, len(v), 4):
|
|
r = (r << 32) | struct.unpack(f, v[i:i + 4])[0]
|
|
return r
|
|
|
|
def read_mpint1(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
# NOTE: Data Type Enc @ http://www.snailbook.com/docs/protocol-1.5.txt
|
|
bits = struct.unpack('>H', self.read(2))[0]
|
|
n = (bits + 7) // 8
|
|
return self._parse_mpint(self.read(n), b'\x00', '>I')
|
|
|
|
def read_mpint2(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
# NOTE: Section 5 @ https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
|
|
v = self.read_string()
|
|
if len(v) == 0:
|
|
return 0
|
|
pad, f = (b'\xff', '>i') if ord(v[0:1]) & 0x80 != 0 else (b'\x00', '>I')
|
|
return self._parse_mpint(v, pad, f)
|
|
|
|
def read_line(self):
|
|
# type: () -> text_type
|
|
return self._buf.readline().rstrip().decode('utf-8', 'replace')
|
|
|
|
def reset(self):
|
|
self._buf = BytesIO()
|
|
self._len = 0
|
|
super(ReadBuf, self).reset()
|
|
|
|
class WriteBuf(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, data=None):
|
|
# type: (Optional[binary_type]) -> None
|
|
super(WriteBuf, self).__init__()
|
|
self._wbuf = BytesIO(data) if data is not None else BytesIO()
|
|
|
|
def write(self, data):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> WriteBuf
|
|
self._wbuf.write(data)
|
|
return self
|
|
|
|
def write_byte(self, v):
|
|
# type: (int) -> WriteBuf
|
|
return self.write(struct.pack('B', v))
|
|
|
|
def write_bool(self, v):
|
|
# type: (bool) -> WriteBuf
|
|
return self.write_byte(1 if v else 0)
|
|
|
|
def write_int(self, v):
|
|
# type: (int) -> WriteBuf
|
|
return self.write(struct.pack('>I', v))
|
|
|
|
def write_string(self, v):
|
|
# type: (Union[binary_type, text_type]) -> WriteBuf
|
|
if not isinstance(v, bytes):
|
|
v = bytes(bytearray(v, 'utf-8'))
|
|
self.write_int(len(v))
|
|
return self.write(v)
|
|
|
|
def write_list(self, v):
|
|
# type: (List[text_type]) -> WriteBuf
|
|
return self.write_string(u','.join(v))
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _bitlength(cls, n):
|
|
# type: (int) -> int
|
|
try:
|
|
return n.bit_length()
|
|
except AttributeError:
|
|
return len(bin(n)) - (2 if n > 0 else 3)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _create_mpint(cls, n, signed=True, bits=None):
|
|
# type: (int, bool, Optional[int]) -> binary_type
|
|
if bits is None:
|
|
bits = cls._bitlength(n)
|
|
length = bits // 8 + (1 if n != 0 else 0)
|
|
ql = (length + 7) // 8
|
|
fmt, v2 = '>{0}Q'.format(ql), [0] * ql
|
|
for i in range(ql):
|
|
v2[ql - i - 1] = n & 0xffffffffffffffff
|
|
n >>= 64
|
|
data = bytes(struct.pack(fmt, *v2)[-length:])
|
|
if not signed:
|
|
data = data.lstrip(b'\x00')
|
|
elif data.startswith(b'\xff\x80'):
|
|
data = data[1:]
|
|
return data
|
|
|
|
def write_mpint1(self, n):
|
|
# type: (int) -> WriteBuf
|
|
# NOTE: Data Type Enc @ http://www.snailbook.com/docs/protocol-1.5.txt
|
|
bits = self._bitlength(n)
|
|
data = self._create_mpint(n, False, bits)
|
|
self.write(struct.pack('>H', bits))
|
|
return self.write(data)
|
|
|
|
def write_mpint2(self, n):
|
|
# type: (int) -> WriteBuf
|
|
# NOTE: Section 5 @ https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt
|
|
data = self._create_mpint(n)
|
|
return self.write_string(data)
|
|
|
|
def write_line(self, v):
|
|
# type: (Union[binary_type, str]) -> WriteBuf
|
|
if not isinstance(v, bytes):
|
|
v = bytes(bytearray(v, 'utf-8'))
|
|
v += b'\r\n'
|
|
return self.write(v)
|
|
|
|
def write_flush(self):
|
|
# type: () -> binary_type
|
|
payload = self._wbuf.getvalue()
|
|
self._wbuf.truncate(0)
|
|
self._wbuf.seek(0)
|
|
return payload
|
|
|
|
def reset(self):
|
|
self._wbuf = BytesIO()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class SSH(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
|
|
class Protocol(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
|
|
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
|
|
SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY = 2
|
|
MSG_DEBUG = 4
|
|
MSG_KEXINIT = 20
|
|
MSG_NEWKEYS = 21
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_INIT = 30
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_REPLY = 31
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST = 34
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_GROUP = 31
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_INIT = 32
|
|
MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY = 33
|
|
|
|
class Product(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
|
|
OpenSSH = 'OpenSSH'
|
|
DropbearSSH = 'Dropbear SSH'
|
|
LibSSH = 'libssh'
|
|
TinySSH = 'TinySSH'
|
|
PuTTY = 'PuTTY'
|
|
|
|
class Software(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, vendor, product, version, patch, os_version):
|
|
# type: (Optional[str], str, str, Optional[str], Optional[str]) -> None
|
|
self.__vendor = vendor
|
|
self.__product = product
|
|
self.__version = version
|
|
self.__patch = patch
|
|
self.__os = os_version
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def vendor(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self.__vendor
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def product(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
return self.__product
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def version(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
return self.__version
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def patch(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self.__patch
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def os(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self.__os
|
|
|
|
def compare_version(self, other):
|
|
# type: (Union[None, SSH.Software, text_type]) -> int
|
|
# pylint: disable=too-many-branches
|
|
if other is None:
|
|
return 1
|
|
if isinstance(other, SSH.Software):
|
|
other = '{0}{1}'.format(other.version, other.patch or '')
|
|
else:
|
|
other = str(other)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)$', other)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
oversion, opatch = mx.group(1), mx.group(2).strip()
|
|
else:
|
|
oversion, opatch = other, ''
|
|
if self.version < oversion:
|
|
return -1
|
|
elif self.version > oversion:
|
|
return 1
|
|
spatch = self.patch or ''
|
|
if self.product == SSH.Product.DropbearSSH:
|
|
if not re.match(r'^test\d.*$', opatch):
|
|
opatch = 'z{0}'.format(opatch)
|
|
if not re.match(r'^test\d.*$', spatch):
|
|
spatch = 'z{0}'.format(spatch)
|
|
elif self.product == SSH.Product.OpenSSH:
|
|
mx1 = re.match(r'^p\d(.*)', opatch)
|
|
mx2 = re.match(r'^p\d(.*)', spatch)
|
|
if not (bool(mx1) and bool(mx2)):
|
|
if bool(mx1):
|
|
opatch = mx1.group(1)
|
|
if bool(mx2):
|
|
spatch = mx2.group(1)
|
|
if spatch < opatch:
|
|
return -1
|
|
elif spatch > opatch:
|
|
return 1
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
def between_versions(self, vfrom, vtill):
|
|
# type: (str, str) -> bool
|
|
if bool(vfrom) and self.compare_version(vfrom) < 0:
|
|
return False
|
|
if bool(vtill) and self.compare_version(vtill) > 0:
|
|
return False
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def display(self, full=True):
|
|
# type: (bool) -> str
|
|
r = '{0} '.format(self.vendor) if bool(self.vendor) else ''
|
|
r += self.product
|
|
if bool(self.version):
|
|
r += ' {0}'.format(self.version)
|
|
if full:
|
|
patch = self.patch or ''
|
|
if self.product == SSH.Product.OpenSSH:
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^(p\d)(.*)$', patch)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
r += mx.group(1)
|
|
patch = mx.group(2).strip()
|
|
if bool(patch):
|
|
r += ' ({0})'.format(patch)
|
|
if bool(self.os):
|
|
r += ' running on {0}'.format(self.os)
|
|
return r
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
return self.display()
|
|
|
|
def __repr__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
r = 'vendor={0}, '.format(self.vendor) if bool(self.vendor) else ''
|
|
r += 'product={0}'.format(self.product)
|
|
if bool(self.version):
|
|
r += ', version={0}'.format(self.version)
|
|
if bool(self.patch):
|
|
r += ', patch={0}'.format(self.patch)
|
|
if bool(self.os):
|
|
r += ', os={0}'.format(self.os)
|
|
return '<{0}({1})>'.format(self.__class__.__name__, r)
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def _fix_patch(patch):
|
|
# type: (str) -> Optional[str]
|
|
return re.sub(r'^[-_\.]+', '', patch) or None
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def _fix_date(d):
|
|
# type: (str) -> Optional[str]
|
|
if d is not None and len(d) == 8:
|
|
return '{0}-{1}-{2}'.format(d[:4], d[4:6], d[6:8])
|
|
else:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _extract_os_version(cls, c):
|
|
# type: (Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]
|
|
if c is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^NetBSD(?:_Secure_Shell)?(?:[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*))?$', c)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
d = cls._fix_date(mx.group(1))
|
|
return 'NetBSD' if d is None else 'NetBSD ({0})'.format(d)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^FreeBSD(?:\slocalisations)?[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*)$', c)
|
|
if not bool(mx):
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^[^@]+@FreeBSD\.org[\s-]+(\d{8})(.*)$', c)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
d = cls._fix_date(mx.group(1))
|
|
return 'FreeBSD' if d is None else 'FreeBSD ({0})'.format(d)
|
|
w = ['RemotelyAnywhere', 'DesktopAuthority', 'RemoteSupportManager']
|
|
for win_soft in w:
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^in ' + win_soft + r' ([\d\.]+\d)$', c)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
ver = mx.group(1)
|
|
return 'Microsoft Windows ({0} {1})'.format(win_soft, ver)
|
|
generic = ['NetBSD', 'FreeBSD']
|
|
for g in generic:
|
|
if c.startswith(g) or c.endswith(g):
|
|
return g
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def parse(cls, banner):
|
|
# type: (SSH.Banner) -> Optional[SSH.Software]
|
|
# pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
|
|
software = str(banner.software)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^dropbear_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
|
|
v = None # type: Optional[str]
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
|
|
v, p = 'Matt Johnston', SSH.Product.DropbearSSH
|
|
v = None
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, None)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^OpenSSH[_\.-]+([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
|
|
v, p = 'OpenBSD', SSH.Product.OpenSSH
|
|
v = None
|
|
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^libssh-([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
|
|
v, p = None, SSH.Product.LibSSH
|
|
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^libssh_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
|
|
v, p = None, SSH.Product.LibSSH
|
|
os_version = cls._extract_os_version(banner.comments)
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, os_version)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^RomSShell_([\d\.]+\d+)(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
patch = cls._fix_patch(mx.group(2))
|
|
v, p = 'Allegro Software', 'RomSShell'
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), patch, None)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^mpSSH_([\d\.]+\d+)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
v, p = 'HP', 'iLO (Integrated Lights-Out) sshd'
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), None, None)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^Cisco-([\d\.]+\d+)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
v, p = 'Cisco', 'IOS/PIX sshd'
|
|
return cls(v, p, mx.group(1), None, None)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^tinyssh_(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
return cls(None, SSH.Product.TinySSH, mx.group(1), None, None)
|
|
mx = re.match(r'^PuTTY_Release_(.*)', software)
|
|
if bool(mx):
|
|
return cls(None, SSH.Product.PuTTY, mx.group(1), None, None)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
class Banner(object):
|
|
_RXP, _RXR = r'SSH-\d\.\s*?\d+', r'(-\s*([^\s]*)(?:\s+(.*))?)?'
|
|
RX_PROTOCOL = re.compile(re.sub(r'\\d(\+?)', r'(\\d\g<1>)', _RXP))
|
|
RX_BANNER = re.compile(r'^({0}(?:(?:-{0})*)){1}$'.format(_RXP, _RXR))
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, protocol, software, comments, valid_ascii):
|
|
# type: (Tuple[int, int], Optional[str], Optional[str], bool) -> None
|
|
self.__protocol = protocol
|
|
self.__software = software
|
|
self.__comments = comments
|
|
self.__valid_ascii = valid_ascii
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def protocol(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Tuple[int, int]
|
|
return self.__protocol
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def software(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self.__software
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def comments(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self.__comments
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def valid_ascii(self):
|
|
# type: () -> bool
|
|
return self.__valid_ascii
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
r = 'SSH-{0}.{1}'.format(self.protocol[0], self.protocol[1])
|
|
if self.software is not None:
|
|
r += '-{0}'.format(self.software)
|
|
if bool(self.comments):
|
|
r += ' {0}'.format(self.comments)
|
|
return r
|
|
|
|
def __repr__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
p = '{0}.{1}'.format(self.protocol[0], self.protocol[1])
|
|
r = 'protocol={0}'.format(p)
|
|
if self.software is not None:
|
|
r += ', software={0}'.format(self.software)
|
|
if bool(self.comments):
|
|
r += ', comments={0}'.format(self.comments)
|
|
return '<{0}({1})>'.format(self.__class__.__name__, r)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def parse(cls, banner):
|
|
# type: (text_type) -> Optional[SSH.Banner]
|
|
valid_ascii = utils.is_print_ascii(banner)
|
|
ascii_banner = utils.to_print_ascii(banner)
|
|
mx = cls.RX_BANNER.match(ascii_banner)
|
|
if not bool(mx):
|
|
return None
|
|
protocol = min(re.findall(cls.RX_PROTOCOL, mx.group(1)))
|
|
protocol = (int(protocol[0]), int(protocol[1]))
|
|
software = (mx.group(3) or '').strip() or None
|
|
if software is None and (mx.group(2) or '').startswith('-'):
|
|
software = ''
|
|
comments = (mx.group(4) or '').strip() or None
|
|
if comments is not None:
|
|
comments = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', comments)
|
|
return cls(protocol, software, comments, valid_ascii)
|
|
|
|
class Fingerprint(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, fpd):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> None
|
|
self.__fpd = fpd
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def md5(self):
|
|
# type: () -> text_type
|
|
h = hashlib.md5(self.__fpd).hexdigest()
|
|
r = u':'.join(h[i:i + 2] for i in range(0, len(h), 2))
|
|
return u'MD5:{0}'.format(r)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def sha256(self):
|
|
# type: () -> text_type
|
|
h = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(self.__fpd).digest())
|
|
r = h.decode('ascii').rstrip('=')
|
|
return u'SHA256:{0}'.format(r)
|
|
|
|
class Algorithm(object):
|
|
class Timeframe(object):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
self.__storage = {} # type: Dict[str, List[Optional[str]]]
|
|
|
|
def __contains__(self, product):
|
|
# type: (str) -> bool
|
|
return product in self.__storage
|
|
|
|
def __getitem__(self, product):
|
|
# type: (str) -> Sequence[Optional[str]]
|
|
return tuple(self.__storage.get(product, [None]*4))
|
|
|
|
def __str__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
return self.__storage.__str__()
|
|
|
|
def __repr__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> str
|
|
return self.__str__()
|
|
|
|
def get_from(self, product, for_server=True):
|
|
# type: (str, bool) -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self[product][0 if bool(for_server) else 2]
|
|
|
|
def get_till(self, product, for_server=True):
|
|
# type: (str, bool) -> Optional[str]
|
|
return self[product][1 if bool(for_server) else 3]
|
|
|
|
def _update(self, versions, pos):
|
|
# type: (Optional[str], int) -> None
|
|
ssh_versions = {} # type: Dict[str, str]
|
|
for_srv, for_cli = pos < 2, pos > 1
|
|
for v in (versions or '').split(','):
|
|
ssh_prod, ssh_ver, is_cli = SSH.Algorithm.get_ssh_version(v)
|
|
if (not ssh_ver or
|
|
(is_cli and for_srv) or
|
|
(not is_cli and for_cli and ssh_prod in ssh_versions)):
|
|
continue
|
|
ssh_versions[ssh_prod] = ssh_ver
|
|
for ssh_product, ssh_version in ssh_versions.items():
|
|
if ssh_product not in self.__storage:
|
|
self.__storage[ssh_product] = [None]*4
|
|
prev = self[ssh_product][pos]
|
|
if (prev is None or
|
|
(prev < ssh_version and pos % 2 == 0) or
|
|
(prev > ssh_version and pos % 2 == 1)):
|
|
self.__storage[ssh_product][pos] = ssh_version
|
|
|
|
def update(self, versions, for_server=None):
|
|
# type: (List[Optional[str]], Optional[bool]) -> SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe
|
|
for_cli = for_server is None or for_server is False
|
|
for_srv = for_server is None or for_server is True
|
|
vlen = len(versions)
|
|
for i in range(min(3, vlen)):
|
|
if for_srv and i < 2:
|
|
self._update(versions[i], i)
|
|
if for_cli and (i % 2 == 0 or vlen == 2):
|
|
self._update(versions[i], 3 - 0**i)
|
|
return self
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def get_ssh_version(version_desc):
|
|
# type: (str) -> Tuple[str, str, bool]
|
|
is_client = version_desc.endswith('C')
|
|
if is_client:
|
|
version_desc = version_desc[:-1]
|
|
if version_desc.startswith('d'):
|
|
return SSH.Product.DropbearSSH, version_desc[1:], is_client
|
|
elif version_desc.startswith('l1'):
|
|
return SSH.Product.LibSSH, version_desc[2:], is_client
|
|
else:
|
|
return SSH.Product.OpenSSH, version_desc, is_client
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def get_since_text(cls, versions):
|
|
# type: (List[Optional[str]]) -> Optional[text_type]
|
|
tv = []
|
|
if len(versions) == 0 or versions[0] is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
for v in versions[0].split(','):
|
|
ssh_prod, ssh_ver, is_cli = cls.get_ssh_version(v)
|
|
if not ssh_ver:
|
|
continue
|
|
if ssh_prod in [SSH.Product.LibSSH]:
|
|
continue
|
|
if is_cli:
|
|
ssh_ver = '{0} (client only)'.format(ssh_ver)
|
|
tv.append('{0} {1}'.format(ssh_prod, ssh_ver))
|
|
if len(tv) == 0:
|
|
return None
|
|
return 'available since ' + ', '.join(tv).rstrip(', ')
|
|
|
|
class Algorithms(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, pkm, kex):
|
|
# type: (Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage], Optional[SSH2.Kex]) -> None
|
|
self.__ssh1kex = pkm
|
|
self.__ssh2kex = kex
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def ssh1kex(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage]
|
|
return self.__ssh1kex
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def ssh2kex(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[SSH2.Kex]
|
|
return self.__ssh2kex
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def ssh1(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[SSH.Algorithms.Item]
|
|
if self.ssh1kex is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
item = SSH.Algorithms.Item(1, SSH1.KexDB.ALGORITHMS)
|
|
item.add('key', [u'ssh-rsa1'])
|
|
item.add('enc', self.ssh1kex.supported_ciphers)
|
|
item.add('aut', self.ssh1kex.supported_authentications)
|
|
return item
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def ssh2(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Optional[SSH.Algorithms.Item]
|
|
if self.ssh2kex is None:
|
|
return None
|
|
item = SSH.Algorithms.Item(2, SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS)
|
|
item.add('kex', self.ssh2kex.kex_algorithms)
|
|
item.add('key', self.ssh2kex.key_algorithms)
|
|
item.add('enc', self.ssh2kex.server.encryption)
|
|
item.add('mac', self.ssh2kex.server.mac)
|
|
return item
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def values(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Iterable[SSH.Algorithms.Item]
|
|
for item in [self.ssh1, self.ssh2]:
|
|
if item is not None:
|
|
yield item
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def maxlen(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
def _ml(items):
|
|
# type: (Sequence[text_type]) -> int
|
|
return max(len(i) for i in items)
|
|
maxlen = 0
|
|
if self.ssh1kex is not None:
|
|
maxlen = max(_ml(self.ssh1kex.supported_ciphers),
|
|
_ml(self.ssh1kex.supported_authentications),
|
|
maxlen)
|
|
if self.ssh2kex is not None:
|
|
maxlen = max(_ml(self.ssh2kex.kex_algorithms),
|
|
_ml(self.ssh2kex.key_algorithms),
|
|
_ml(self.ssh2kex.server.encryption),
|
|
_ml(self.ssh2kex.server.mac),
|
|
maxlen)
|
|
return maxlen
|
|
|
|
def get_ssh_timeframe(self, for_server=None):
|
|
# type: (Optional[bool]) -> SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe
|
|
timeframe = SSH.Algorithm.Timeframe()
|
|
for alg_pair in self.values:
|
|
alg_db = alg_pair.db
|
|
for alg_type, alg_list in alg_pair.items():
|
|
for alg_name in alg_list:
|
|
alg_name_native = utils.to_ntext(alg_name)
|
|
alg_desc = alg_db[alg_type].get(alg_name_native)
|
|
if alg_desc is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
versions = alg_desc[0]
|
|
timeframe.update(versions, for_server)
|
|
return timeframe
|
|
|
|
def get_recommendations(self, software, for_server=True):
|
|
# type: (Optional[SSH.Software], bool) -> Tuple[Optional[SSH.Software], Dict[int, Dict[str, Dict[str, Dict[str, int]]]]]
|
|
# pylint: disable=too-many-locals,too-many-statements
|
|
vproducts = [SSH.Product.OpenSSH,
|
|
SSH.Product.DropbearSSH,
|
|
SSH.Product.LibSSH,
|
|
SSH.Product.TinySSH]
|
|
# Set to True if server is not one of vproducts, above.
|
|
unknown_software = False
|
|
if software is not None:
|
|
if software.product not in vproducts:
|
|
unknown_software = True
|
|
#
|
|
# The code below is commented out because it would try to guess what the server is,
|
|
# usually resulting in wild & incorrect recommendations.
|
|
#
|
|
# if software is None:
|
|
# ssh_timeframe = self.get_ssh_timeframe(for_server)
|
|
# for product in vproducts:
|
|
# if product not in ssh_timeframe:
|
|
# continue
|
|
# version = ssh_timeframe.get_from(product, for_server)
|
|
# if version is not None:
|
|
# software = SSH.Software(None, product, version, None, None)
|
|
# break
|
|
rec = {} # type: Dict[int, Dict[str, Dict[str, Dict[str, int]]]]
|
|
if software is None:
|
|
unknown_software = True
|
|
for alg_pair in self.values:
|
|
sshv, alg_db = alg_pair.sshv, alg_pair.db
|
|
rec[sshv] = {}
|
|
for alg_type, alg_list in alg_pair.items():
|
|
if alg_type == 'aut':
|
|
continue
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type] = {'add': {}, 'del': {}, 'chg': {}}
|
|
for n, alg_desc in alg_db[alg_type].items():
|
|
versions = alg_desc[0]
|
|
empty_version = False
|
|
if len(versions) == 0 or versions[0] is None:
|
|
empty_version = True
|
|
if not empty_version:
|
|
matches = False
|
|
if unknown_software:
|
|
matches = True
|
|
for v in versions[0].split(','):
|
|
ssh_prefix, ssh_version, is_cli = SSH.Algorithm.get_ssh_version(v)
|
|
if not ssh_version:
|
|
continue
|
|
if (software is not None) and (ssh_prefix != software.product):
|
|
continue
|
|
if is_cli and for_server:
|
|
continue
|
|
if (software is not None) and (software.compare_version(ssh_version) < 0):
|
|
continue
|
|
matches = True
|
|
break
|
|
if not matches:
|
|
continue
|
|
adl, faults = len(alg_desc), 0
|
|
for i in range(1, 3):
|
|
if not adl > i:
|
|
continue
|
|
fc = len(alg_desc[i])
|
|
if fc > 0:
|
|
faults += pow(10, 2 - i) * fc
|
|
if n not in alg_list:
|
|
# Don't recommend certificate or token types; these will only appear in the server's list if they are fully configured & functional on the server.
|
|
if faults > 0 or (alg_type == 'key' and (('-cert-' in n) or (n.startswith('sk-')))) or empty_version:
|
|
continue
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'][n] = 0
|
|
else:
|
|
if faults == 0:
|
|
continue
|
|
if n in ['diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', 'rsa-sha2-256', 'rsa-sha2-512', 'ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com']:
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg'][n] = faults
|
|
else:
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'][n] = faults
|
|
# If we are working with unknown software, drop all add recommendations, because we don't know if they're valid.
|
|
if unknown_software:
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'] = {}
|
|
add_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['add'])
|
|
del_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'])
|
|
chg_count = len(rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg'])
|
|
new_alg_count = len(alg_list) + add_count - del_count
|
|
if new_alg_count < 1 and del_count > 0:
|
|
mf = min(rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'].values())
|
|
new_del = {}
|
|
for k, cf in rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'].items():
|
|
if cf != mf:
|
|
new_del[k] = cf
|
|
if del_count != len(new_del):
|
|
rec[sshv][alg_type]['del'] = new_del
|
|
new_alg_count += del_count - len(new_del)
|
|
if new_alg_count < 1:
|
|
del rec[sshv][alg_type]
|
|
else:
|
|
if add_count == 0:
|
|
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['add']
|
|
if del_count == 0:
|
|
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['del']
|
|
if chg_count == 0:
|
|
del rec[sshv][alg_type]['chg']
|
|
if len(rec[sshv][alg_type]) == 0:
|
|
del rec[sshv][alg_type]
|
|
if len(rec[sshv]) == 0:
|
|
del rec[sshv]
|
|
return software, rec
|
|
|
|
class Item(object):
|
|
def __init__(self, sshv, db):
|
|
# type: (int, Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]) -> None
|
|
self.__sshv = sshv
|
|
self.__db = db
|
|
self.__storage = {} # type: Dict[str, List[text_type]]
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def sshv(self):
|
|
# type: () -> int
|
|
return self.__sshv
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def db(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]]
|
|
return self.__db
|
|
|
|
def add(self, key, value):
|
|
# type: (str, List[text_type]) -> None
|
|
self.__storage[key] = value
|
|
|
|
def items(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Iterable[Tuple[str, List[text_type]]]
|
|
return self.__storage.items()
|
|
|
|
class Security(object): # pylint: disable=too-few-public-methods
|
|
# Format: [starting_vuln_version, last_vuln_version, affected, CVE_ID, CVSSv2, description]
|
|
# affected: 1 = server, 2 = client, 4 = local
|
|
# Example: if it affects servers, both remote & local, then affected
|
|
# = 1. If it affects servers, but is a local issue only,
|
|
# then affected = 1 + 4 = 5.
|
|
# pylint: disable=bad-whitespace
|
|
CVE = {
|
|
'Dropbear SSH': [
|
|
['0.0', '2018.76', 1, 'CVE-2018-15599', 5.0, 'remote users may enumerate users on the system'],
|
|
['0.0', '2017.74', 5, 'CVE-2017-9079', 4.7, 'local users can read certain files as root'],
|
|
['0.0', '2017.74', 5, 'CVE-2017-9078', 9.3, 'local users may elevate privileges to root under certain conditions'],
|
|
['0.0', '2016.73', 5, 'CVE-2016-7409', 2.1, 'local users can read process memory under limited conditions'],
|
|
['0.0', '2016.73', 1, 'CVE-2016-7408', 6.5, 'remote users can execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['0.0', '2016.73', 5, 'CVE-2016-7407', 10.0, 'local users can execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['0.0', '2016.73', 1, 'CVE-2016-7406', 10.0, 'remote users can execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['0.44', '2015.71', 1, 'CVE-2016-3116', 5.5, 'bypass command restrictions via xauth command injection'],
|
|
['0.28', '2013.58', 1, 'CVE-2013-4434', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
|
|
['0.28', '2013.58', 1, 'CVE-2013-4421', 5.0, 'cause DoS via a compressed packet (memory consumption)'],
|
|
['0.52', '2011.54', 1, 'CVE-2012-0920', 7.1, 'execute arbitrary code or bypass command restrictions'],
|
|
['0.40', '0.48.1', 1, 'CVE-2007-1099', 7.5, 'conduct a MitM attack (no warning for hostkey mismatch)'],
|
|
['0.28', '0.47', 1, 'CVE-2006-1206', 7.5, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
|
|
['0.39', '0.47', 1, 'CVE-2006-0225', 4.6, 'execute arbitrary commands via scp with crafted filenames'],
|
|
['0.28', '0.46', 1, 'CVE-2005-4178', 6.5, 'execute arbitrary code via buffer overflow vulnerability'],
|
|
['0.28', '0.42', 1, 'CVE-2004-2486', 7.5, 'execute arbitrary code via DSS verification code']],
|
|
'libssh': [
|
|
['0.6.4', '0.6.4', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
|
|
['0.7.0', '0.7.5', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
|
|
['0.8.0', '0.8.3', 1, 'CVE-2018-10933', 6.4, 'authentication bypass'],
|
|
['0.1', '0.7.2', 1, 'CVE-2016-0739', 4.3, 'conduct a MitM attack (weakness in DH key generation)'],
|
|
['0.5.1', '0.6.4', 1, 'CVE-2015-3146', 5.0, 'cause DoS via kex packets (null pointer dereference)'],
|
|
['0.5.1', '0.6.3', 1, 'CVE-2014-8132', 5.0, 'cause DoS via kex init packet (dangling pointer)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.6.2', 1, 'CVE-2014-0017', 1.9, 'leak data via PRNG state reuse on forking servers'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.3', 1, 'CVE-2013-0176', 4.3, 'cause DoS via kex packet (null pointer dereference)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-6063', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code via sftp (double free)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4562', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (overflow check)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4561', 5.0, 'cause DoS via unspecified vectors (invalid pointer)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4560', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (buffer overflow)'],
|
|
['0.4.7', '0.5.2', 1, 'CVE-2012-4559', 6.8, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (double free)']],
|
|
'OpenSSH': [
|
|
['7.2', '7.2p2', 1, 'CVE-2016-6515', 7.8, 'cause DoS via long password string (crypt CPU consumption)'],
|
|
['1.2.2', '7.2', 1, 'CVE-2016-3115', 5.5, 'bypass command restrictions via crafted X11 forwarding data'],
|
|
['5.4', '7.1', 1, 'CVE-2016-1907', 5.0, 'cause DoS via crafted network traffic (out of bounds read)'],
|
|
['5.4', '7.1p1', 2, 'CVE-2016-0778', 4.6, 'cause DoS via requesting many forwardings (heap based buffer overflow)'],
|
|
['5.0', '7.1p1', 2, 'CVE-2016-0777', 4.0, 'leak data via allowing transfer of entire buffer'],
|
|
['6.0', '7.2p2', 5, 'CVE-2015-8325', 7.2, 'privilege escalation via triggering crafted environment'],
|
|
['6.8', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6565', 7.2, 'cause DoS via writing to a device (terminal disruption)'],
|
|
['5.0', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6564', 6.9, 'privilege escalation via leveraging sshd uid'],
|
|
['5.0', '6.9', 5, 'CVE-2015-6563', 1.9, 'conduct impersonation attack'],
|
|
['6.9p1', '6.9p1', 1, 'CVE-2015-5600', 8.5, 'cause Dos or aid in conduct brute force attack (CPU consumption)'],
|
|
['6.0', '6.6', 1, 'CVE-2015-5352', 4.3, 'bypass access restrictions via a specific connection'],
|
|
['6.0', '6.6', 2, 'CVE-2014-2653', 5.8, 'bypass SSHFP DNS RR check via unacceptable host certificate'],
|
|
['5.0', '6.5', 1, 'CVE-2014-2532', 5.8, 'bypass environment restrictions via specific string before wildcard'],
|
|
['1.2', '6.4', 1, 'CVE-2014-1692', 7.5, 'cause DoS via triggering error condition (memory corruption)'],
|
|
['6.2', '6.3', 1, 'CVE-2013-4548', 6.0, 'bypass command restrictions via crafted packet data'],
|
|
['1.2', '5.6', 1, 'CVE-2012-0814', 3.5, 'leak data via debug messages'],
|
|
['1.2', '5.8', 1, 'CVE-2011-5000', 3.5, 'cause DoS via large value in certain length field (memory consumption)'],
|
|
['5.6', '5.7', 2, 'CVE-2011-0539', 5.0, 'leak data or conduct hash collision attack'],
|
|
['1.2', '6.1', 1, 'CVE-2010-5107', 5.0, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
|
|
['1.2', '5.8', 1, 'CVE-2010-4755', 4.0, 'cause DoS via crafted glob expression (CPU and memory consumption)'],
|
|
['1.2', '5.6', 1, 'CVE-2010-4478', 7.5, 'bypass authentication check via crafted values'],
|
|
['4.3', '4.8', 1, 'CVE-2009-2904', 6.9, 'privilege escalation via hard links to setuid programs'],
|
|
['4.0', '5.1', 1, 'CVE-2008-5161', 2.6, 'recover plaintext data from ciphertext'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2008-4109', 5.0, 'cause DoS via multiple login attempts (slot exhaustion)'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.8', 1, 'CVE-2008-1657', 6.5, 'bypass command restrictions via modifying session file'],
|
|
['1.2.2', '4.9', 1, 'CVE-2008-1483', 6.9, 'hijack forwarded X11 connections'],
|
|
['4.0', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2007-4752', 7.5, 'privilege escalation via causing an X client to be trusted'],
|
|
['4.3p2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2007-3102', 4.3, 'allow attacker to write random data to audit log'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.6', 1, 'CVE-2007-2243', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different responses'],
|
|
['4.4', '4.4', 1, 'CVE-2006-5794', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
|
|
['4.1', '4.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-5229', 2.6, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-5052', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different responses'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-5051', 9.3, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code (double free)'],
|
|
['4.5', '4.5', 1, 'CVE-2006-4925', 5.0, 'cause DoS via invalid protocol sequence (crash)'],
|
|
['1.2', '4.3p2', 1, 'CVE-2006-4924', 7.8, 'cause DoS via crafted packet (CPU consumption)'],
|
|
['3.8.1p1', '3.8.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-0883', 5.0, 'cause DoS via connecting multiple times (client connection refusal)'],
|
|
['3.0', '4.2p1', 1, 'CVE-2006-0225', 4.6, 'execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['2.1', '4.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2005-2798', 5.0, 'leak data about authentication credentials'],
|
|
['3.5', '3.5p1', 1, 'CVE-2004-2760', 6.8, 'leak data through different connection states'],
|
|
['2.3', '3.7.1p2', 1, 'CVE-2004-2069', 5.0, 'cause DoS via large number of connections (slot exhaustion)'],
|
|
['3.0', '3.4p1', 1, 'CVE-2004-0175', 4.3, 'leak data through directoy traversal'],
|
|
['1.2', '3.9p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-1562', 7.6, 'leak data about authentication credentials'],
|
|
['3.1p1', '3.7.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0787', 7.5, 'privilege escalation via modifying stack'],
|
|
['3.1p1', '3.7.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0786', 10.0, 'privilege escalation via bypassing authentication'],
|
|
['1.0', '3.7.1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0695', 7.5, 'cause DoS or execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['1.0', '3.7', 1, 'CVE-2003-0693', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['3.0', '3.6.1p2', 1, 'CVE-2003-0386', 7.5, 'bypass address restrictions for connection'],
|
|
['3.1p1', '3.6.1p1', 1, 'CVE-2003-0190', 5.0, 'discover valid usernames through different time delays'],
|
|
['3.2.2', '3.2.2', 1, 'CVE-2002-0765', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
|
|
['1.2.2', '3.3p1', 1, 'CVE-2002-0640', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['1.2.2', '3.3p1', 1, 'CVE-2002-0639', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code'],
|
|
['2.1', '3.2', 1, 'CVE-2002-0575', 7.5, 'privilege escalation'],
|
|
['2.1', '3.0.2p1', 2, 'CVE-2002-0083', 10.0, 'privilege escalation'],
|
|
['3.0', '3.0p1', 1, 'CVE-2001-1507', 7.5, 'bypass authentication'],
|
|
['1.2.3', '3.0.1p1', 5, 'CVE-2001-0872', 7.2, 'privilege escalation via crafted environment variables'],
|
|
['1.2.3', '2.1.1', 1, 'CVE-2001-0361', 4.0, 'recover plaintext from ciphertext'],
|
|
['1.2', '2.1', 1, 'CVE-2000-0525', 10.0, 'execute arbitrary code (improper privileges)']],
|
|
'PuTTY': [
|
|
['0.0', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17069', 5.0, 'potential DOS by remote SSHv1 server'],
|
|
['0.71', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17068', 5.0, 'xterm bracketed paste mode command injection'],
|
|
['0.52', '0.72', 2, 'CVE-2019-17067', 7.5, 'port rebinding weakness in port forward tunnel handling'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.71', 2, 'CVE-2019-XXXX', 5.0, 'undefined vulnerability in obsolete SSHv1 protocol handling'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.71', 6, 'CVE-2019-XXXX', 5.0, 'local privilege escalation in Pageant'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9898', 7.5, 'potential recycling of random numbers'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9897', 5.0, 'multiple denial-of-service issues from writing to the terminal'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.70', 6, 'CVE-2019-9896', 4.6, 'local application hijacking through malicious Windows help file'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.70', 2, 'CVE-2019-9894', 6.4, 'buffer overflow in RSA key exchange'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.69', 6, 'CVE-2016-6167', 4.4, 'local application hijacking through untrusted DLL loading'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.67', 2, 'CVE-2017-6542', 7.5, 'buffer overflow in UNIX client that can result in privilege escalation or denial-of-service'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.66', 2, 'CVE-2016-2563', 7.5, 'buffer overflow in SCP command-line utility'],
|
|
['0.0', '0.65', 2, 'CVE-2015-5309', 4.3, 'integer overflow in terminal-handling code'],
|
|
]
|
|
} # type: Dict[str, List[List[Any]]]
|
|
TXT = {
|
|
'Dropbear SSH': [
|
|
['0.28', '0.34', 1, 'remote root exploit', 'remote format string buffer overflow exploit (exploit-db#387)']],
|
|
'libssh': [
|
|
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 1, 'null pointer check', 'missing null pointer check in "crypt_set_algorithms_server"'],
|
|
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 1, 'integer overflow', 'integer overflow in "buffer_get_data"'],
|
|
['0.3.3', '0.3.3', 3, 'heap overflow', 'heap overflow in "packet_decrypt"']]
|
|
} # type: Dict[str, List[List[Any]]]
|
|
|
|
class Socket(ReadBuf, WriteBuf):
|
|
class InsufficientReadException(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
SM_BANNER_SENT = 1
|
|
|
|
def __init__(self, host, port, ipvo=None, timeout=5, timeout_set=False):
|
|
# type: (Optional[str], int) -> None
|
|
super(SSH.Socket, self).__init__()
|
|
self.__sock = None # type: Optional[socket.socket]
|
|
self.__sock_map = {}
|
|
self.__block_size = 8
|
|
self.__state = 0
|
|
self.__header = [] # type: List[text_type]
|
|
self.__banner = None # type: Optional[SSH.Banner]
|
|
if host is None:
|
|
raise ValueError('undefined host')
|
|
nport = utils.parse_int(port)
|
|
if nport < 1 or nport > 65535:
|
|
raise ValueError('invalid port: {0}'.format(port))
|
|
self.__host = host
|
|
self.__port = nport
|
|
if ipvo is not None:
|
|
self.__ipvo = ipvo
|
|
else:
|
|
self.__ipvo = ()
|
|
self.__timeout = timeout
|
|
self.__timeout_set = timeout_set
|
|
self.client_host = None
|
|
self.client_port = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _resolve(self, ipvo):
|
|
# type: (Sequence[int]) -> Iterable[Tuple[int, Tuple[Any, ...]]]
|
|
ipvo = tuple([x for x in utils.unique_seq(ipvo) if x in (4, 6)])
|
|
ipvo_len = len(ipvo)
|
|
prefer_ipvo = ipvo_len > 0
|
|
prefer_ipv4 = prefer_ipvo and ipvo[0] == 4
|
|
if ipvo_len == 1:
|
|
family = socket.AF_INET if ipvo[0] == 4 else socket.AF_INET6
|
|
else:
|
|
family = socket.AF_UNSPEC
|
|
try:
|
|
stype = socket.SOCK_STREAM
|
|
r = socket.getaddrinfo(self.__host, self.__port, family, stype)
|
|
if prefer_ipvo:
|
|
r = sorted(r, key=lambda x: x[0], reverse=not prefer_ipv4)
|
|
check = any(stype == rline[2] for rline in r)
|
|
for af, socktype, _proto, _canonname, addr in r:
|
|
if not check or socktype == socket.SOCK_STREAM:
|
|
yield af, addr
|
|
except socket.error as e:
|
|
out.fail('[exception] {0}'.format(e))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Listens on a server socket and accepts one connection (used for
|
|
# auditing client connections).
|
|
def listen_and_accept(self):
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# Socket to listen on all IPv4 addresses.
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
|
|
s.bind(('0.0.0.0', self.__port))
|
|
s.listen()
|
|
self.__sock_map[s.fileno()] = s
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
print("Warning: failed to listen on any IPv4 interfaces.")
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# Socket to listen on all IPv6 addresses.
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
|
|
s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 1)
|
|
s.bind(('::', self.__port))
|
|
s.listen()
|
|
self.__sock_map[s.fileno()] = s
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
print("Warning: failed to listen on any IPv6 interfaces.")
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
# If we failed to listen on any interfaces, terminate.
|
|
if len(self.__sock_map.keys()) == 0:
|
|
print("Error: failed to listen on any IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces!")
|
|
exit(-1)
|
|
|
|
# Wait for an incoming connection. If a timeout was explicitly
|
|
# set by the user, terminate when it elapses.
|
|
fds = None
|
|
time_elapsed = 0.0
|
|
interval = 1.0
|
|
while True:
|
|
# Wait for a connection on either socket.
|
|
fds = select.select(self.__sock_map.keys(), [], [], interval)
|
|
time_elapsed += interval
|
|
|
|
# We have incoming data on at least one of the sockets.
|
|
if len(fds[0]) > 0:
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
if self.__timeout_set and time_elapsed >= self.__timeout:
|
|
print("Timeout elapsed. Terminating...")
|
|
exit(-1)
|
|
|
|
# Accept the connection.
|
|
c, addr = self.__sock_map[fds[0][0]].accept()
|
|
self.client_host = addr[0]
|
|
self.client_port = addr[1]
|
|
c.settimeout(self.__timeout)
|
|
self.__sock = c
|
|
|
|
|
|
def connect(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
err = None
|
|
for af, addr in self._resolve(self.__ipvo):
|
|
s = None
|
|
try:
|
|
s = socket.socket(af, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.settimeout(self.__timeout)
|
|
s.connect(addr)
|
|
self.__sock = s
|
|
return
|
|
except socket.error as e:
|
|
err = e
|
|
self._close_socket(s)
|
|
if err is None:
|
|
errm = 'host {0} has no DNS records'.format(self.__host)
|
|
else:
|
|
errt = (self.__host, self.__port, err)
|
|
errm = 'cannot connect to {0} port {1}: {2}'.format(*errt)
|
|
out.fail('[exception] {0}'.format(errm))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
def get_banner(self, sshv=2):
|
|
# type: (int) -> Tuple[Optional[SSH.Banner], List[text_type], Optional[str]]
|
|
if self.__sock is None:
|
|
return self.__banner, self.__header, 'not connected'
|
|
banner = SSH_HEADER.format('1.5' if sshv == 1 else '2.0')
|
|
if self.__state < self.SM_BANNER_SENT:
|
|
self.send_banner(banner)
|
|
# rto = self.__sock.gettimeout()
|
|
# self.__sock.settimeout(0.7)
|
|
s, e = self.recv()
|
|
# self.__sock.settimeout(rto)
|
|
if s < 0:
|
|
return self.__banner, self.__header, e
|
|
e = None
|
|
while self.__banner is None:
|
|
if not s > 0:
|
|
s, e = self.recv()
|
|
if s < 0:
|
|
break
|
|
while self.__banner is None and self.unread_len > 0:
|
|
line = self.read_line()
|
|
if len(line.strip()) == 0:
|
|
continue
|
|
if self.__banner is None:
|
|
self.__banner = SSH.Banner.parse(line)
|
|
if self.__banner is not None:
|
|
continue
|
|
self.__header.append(line)
|
|
s = 0
|
|
return self.__banner, self.__header, e
|
|
|
|
def recv(self, size=2048):
|
|
# type: (int) -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]
|
|
if self.__sock is None:
|
|
return -1, 'not connected'
|
|
try:
|
|
data = self.__sock.recv(size)
|
|
except socket.timeout:
|
|
return -1, 'timed out'
|
|
except socket.error as e:
|
|
if e.args[0] in (errno.EAGAIN, errno.EWOULDBLOCK):
|
|
return 0, 'retry'
|
|
return -1, str(e.args[-1])
|
|
if len(data) == 0:
|
|
return -1, None
|
|
pos = self._buf.tell()
|
|
self._buf.seek(0, 2)
|
|
self._buf.write(data)
|
|
self._len += len(data)
|
|
self._buf.seek(pos, 0)
|
|
return len(data), None
|
|
|
|
def send(self, data):
|
|
# type: (binary_type) -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]
|
|
if self.__sock is None:
|
|
return -1, 'not connected'
|
|
try:
|
|
self.__sock.send(data)
|
|
return 0, None
|
|
except socket.error as e:
|
|
return -1, str(e.args[-1])
|
|
self.__sock.send(data)
|
|
|
|
def send_banner(self, banner):
|
|
# type: (str) -> None
|
|
self.send(banner.encode() + b'\r\n')
|
|
if self.__state < self.SM_BANNER_SENT:
|
|
self.__state = self.SM_BANNER_SENT
|
|
|
|
def ensure_read(self, size):
|
|
# type: (int) -> None
|
|
while self.unread_len < size:
|
|
s, e = self.recv()
|
|
if s < 0:
|
|
raise SSH.Socket.InsufficientReadException(e)
|
|
|
|
def read_packet(self, sshv=2):
|
|
# type: (int) -> Tuple[int, binary_type]
|
|
try:
|
|
header = WriteBuf()
|
|
self.ensure_read(4)
|
|
packet_length = self.read_int()
|
|
header.write_int(packet_length)
|
|
# XXX: validate length
|
|
if sshv == 1:
|
|
padding_length = 8 - packet_length % 8
|
|
self.ensure_read(padding_length)
|
|
padding = self.read(padding_length)
|
|
header.write(padding)
|
|
payload_length = packet_length
|
|
check_size = padding_length + payload_length
|
|
else:
|
|
self.ensure_read(1)
|
|
padding_length = self.read_byte()
|
|
header.write_byte(padding_length)
|
|
payload_length = packet_length - padding_length - 1
|
|
check_size = 4 + 1 + payload_length + padding_length
|
|
if check_size % self.__block_size != 0:
|
|
out.fail('[exception] invalid ssh packet (block size)')
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
self.ensure_read(payload_length)
|
|
if sshv == 1:
|
|
payload = self.read(payload_length - 4)
|
|
header.write(payload)
|
|
crc = self.read_int()
|
|
header.write_int(crc)
|
|
else:
|
|
payload = self.read(payload_length)
|
|
header.write(payload)
|
|
packet_type = ord(payload[0:1])
|
|
if sshv == 1:
|
|
rcrc = SSH1.crc32(padding + payload)
|
|
if crc != rcrc:
|
|
out.fail('[exception] packet checksum CRC32 mismatch.')
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
else:
|
|
self.ensure_read(padding_length)
|
|
padding = self.read(padding_length)
|
|
payload = payload[1:]
|
|
return packet_type, payload
|
|
except SSH.Socket.InsufficientReadException as ex:
|
|
if ex.args[0] is None:
|
|
header.write(self.read(self.unread_len))
|
|
e = header.write_flush().strip()
|
|
else:
|
|
e = ex.args[0].encode('utf-8')
|
|
return -1, e
|
|
|
|
def send_packet(self):
|
|
# type: () -> Tuple[int, Optional[str]]
|
|
payload = self.write_flush()
|
|
padding = -(len(payload) + 5) % 8
|
|
if padding < 4:
|
|
padding += 8
|
|
plen = len(payload) + padding + 1
|
|
pad_bytes = b'\x00' * padding
|
|
data = struct.pack('>Ib', plen, padding) + payload + pad_bytes
|
|
return self.send(data)
|
|
|
|
# Returns True if this Socket is connected, otherwise False.
|
|
def is_connected(self):
|
|
return (self.__sock is not None)
|
|
|
|
def close(self):
|
|
self.__cleanup()
|
|
self.reset()
|
|
self.__state = 0
|
|
self.__header = []
|
|
self.__banner = None
|
|
|
|
def reset(self):
|
|
super(SSH.Socket, self).reset()
|
|
|
|
def _close_socket(self, s):
|
|
# type: (Optional[socket.socket]) -> None
|
|
try:
|
|
if s is not None:
|
|
s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
|
|
s.close() # pragma: nocover
|
|
except: # pylint: disable=bare-except
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
def __del__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
self.__cleanup()
|
|
|
|
def __cleanup(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
self._close_socket(self.__sock)
|
|
for fd in self.__sock_map:
|
|
self._close_socket(self.__sock_map[fd])
|
|
self.__sock = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexDH(object): # pragma: nocover
|
|
def __init__(self, kex_name, hash_alg, g, p):
|
|
# type: (str, int, int) -> None
|
|
self.__kex_name = kex_name
|
|
self.__hash_alg = hash_alg
|
|
self.__g = 0
|
|
self.__p = 0
|
|
self.__q = 0
|
|
self.__x = 0
|
|
self.__e = 0
|
|
self.set_params(g, p)
|
|
|
|
self.__ed25519_pubkey = 0
|
|
self.__hostkey_type = None
|
|
self.__hostkey_e = 0
|
|
self.__hostkey_n = 0
|
|
self.__hostkey_n_len = 0 # Length of the host key modulus.
|
|
self.__ca_n_len = 0 # Length of the CA key modulus (if hostkey is a cert).
|
|
self.__f = 0
|
|
self.__h_sig = 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_params(self, g, p):
|
|
self.__g = g
|
|
self.__p = p
|
|
self.__q = (self.__p - 1) // 2
|
|
self.__x = 0
|
|
self.__e = 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT):
|
|
# type: (SSH.Socket) -> None
|
|
r = random.SystemRandom()
|
|
self.__x = r.randrange(2, self.__q)
|
|
self.__e = pow(self.__g, self.__x, self.__p)
|
|
s.write_byte(init_msg)
|
|
s.write_mpint2(self.__e)
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
# Parse a KEXDH_REPLY or KEXDH_GEX_REPLY message from the server. This
|
|
# contains the host key, among other things. Function returns the host
|
|
# key blob (from which the fingerprint can be calculated).
|
|
def recv_reply(self, s, parse_host_key_size=True):
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
|
|
|
|
# Skip any & all MSG_DEBUG messages.
|
|
while packet_type == SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG:
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
|
|
|
|
if packet_type != -1 and packet_type not in [SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY]:
|
|
# TODO: change Exception to something more specific.
|
|
raise Exception('Expected MSG_KEXDH_REPLY (%d) or MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY (%d), but got %d instead.' % (SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY, packet_type))
|
|
elif packet_type == -1:
|
|
# A connection error occurred. We can't parse anything, so just
|
|
# return. The host key modulus (and perhaps certificate modulus)
|
|
# will remain at length 0.
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
hostkey_len = f_len = h_sig_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
hostkey_type_len = hostkey_e_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
key_id_len = principles_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
critical_options_len = extensions_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
nonce_len = ca_key_len = ca_key_type_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
ca_key_len = ca_key_type_len = ca_key_e_len = 0 # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
|
|
key_id = principles = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
critical_options = extensions = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
valid_after = valid_before = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
nonce = ca_key = ca_key_type = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
ca_key_e = ca_key_n = None # pylint: disable=unused-variable
|
|
|
|
# Get the host key blob, F, and signature.
|
|
ptr = 0
|
|
hostkey, hostkey_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# If we are not supposed to parse the host key size (i.e.: it is a type that is of fixed size such as ed25519), then stop here.
|
|
if not parse_host_key_size:
|
|
return hostkey
|
|
|
|
self.__f, f_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
|
|
self.__h_sig, h_sig_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(payload, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# Now pick apart the host key blob.
|
|
# Get the host key type (i.e.: 'ssh-rsa', 'ssh-ed25519', etc).
|
|
ptr = 0
|
|
self.__hostkey_type, hostkey_type_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# If this is an RSA certificate, skip over the nonce.
|
|
if self.__hostkey_type.startswith(b'ssh-rsa-cert-v0'):
|
|
nonce, nonce_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# The public key exponent.
|
|
hostkey_e, hostkey_e_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
self.__hostkey_e = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey_e), 16)
|
|
|
|
# Here is the modulus size & actual modulus of the host key public key.
|
|
hostkey_n, self.__hostkey_n_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
self.__hostkey_n = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey_n), 16)
|
|
|
|
# If this is an RSA certificate, continue parsing to extract the CA
|
|
# key.
|
|
if self.__hostkey_type.startswith(b'ssh-rsa-cert-v0'):
|
|
# Skip over the serial number.
|
|
ptr += 8
|
|
|
|
# Get the certificate type.
|
|
cert_type = int(binascii.hexlify(hostkey[ptr:ptr + 4]), 16)
|
|
ptr += 4
|
|
|
|
# Only SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST (2) makes sense in this context.
|
|
if cert_type == 2:
|
|
|
|
# Skip the key ID (this is the serial number of the
|
|
# certificate).
|
|
key_id, key_id_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# The principles, which are... I don't know what.
|
|
principles, principles_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# The timestamp that this certificate is valid after.
|
|
valid_after = hostkey[ptr:ptr + 8]
|
|
ptr += 8
|
|
|
|
# The timestamp that this certificate is valid before.
|
|
valid_before = hostkey[ptr:ptr + 8]
|
|
ptr += 8
|
|
|
|
# TODO: validate the principles, and time range.
|
|
|
|
# The critical options.
|
|
critical_options, critical_options_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# Certificate extensions.
|
|
extensions, extensions_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# Another nonce.
|
|
nonce, nonce_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# Finally, we get to the CA key.
|
|
ca_key, ca_key_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(hostkey, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# Last in the host key blob is the CA signature. It isn't
|
|
# interesting to us, so we won't bother parsing any further.
|
|
# The CA key has the modulus, however...
|
|
ptr = 0
|
|
|
|
# 'ssh-rsa', 'rsa-sha2-256', etc.
|
|
ca_key_type, ca_key_type_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# CA's public key exponent.
|
|
ca_key_e, ca_key_e_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
|
|
|
|
# CA's modulus. Bingo.
|
|
ca_key_n, self.__ca_n_len, ptr = KexDH.__get_bytes(ca_key, ptr)
|
|
|
|
return hostkey
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def __get_bytes(buf, ptr):
|
|
num_bytes = struct.unpack('>I', buf[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
|
|
ptr += 4
|
|
return buf[ptr:ptr + num_bytes], num_bytes, ptr + num_bytes
|
|
|
|
# Converts a modulus length in bytes to its size in bits, after some
|
|
# possible adjustments.
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def __adjust_key_size(size):
|
|
size = size * 8
|
|
# Actual keys are observed to be about 8 bits bigger than expected
|
|
# (i.e.: 1024-bit keys have a 1032-bit modulus). Check if this is
|
|
# the case, and subtract 8 if so. This simply improves readability
|
|
# in the UI.
|
|
if (size >> 3) % 2 != 0:
|
|
size = size - 8
|
|
return size
|
|
|
|
# Returns the size of the hostkey, in bits.
|
|
def get_hostkey_size(self):
|
|
return KexDH.__adjust_key_size(self.__hostkey_n_len)
|
|
|
|
# Returns the size of the CA key, in bits.
|
|
def get_ca_size(self):
|
|
return KexDH.__adjust_key_size(self.__ca_n_len)
|
|
|
|
# Returns the size of the DH modulus, in bits.
|
|
def get_dh_modulus_size(self):
|
|
# -2 to account for the '0b' prefix in the string.
|
|
return len(bin(self.__p)) - 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup1(KexDH): # pragma: nocover
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
# rfc2409: second oakley group
|
|
p = int('ffffffffffffffffc90fdaa22168c234c4c6628b80dc1cd129024e088a67'
|
|
'cc74020bbea63b139b22514a08798e3404ddef9519b3cd3a431b302b0a6d'
|
|
'f25f14374fe1356d6d51c245e485b576625e7ec6f44c42e9a637ed6b0bff'
|
|
'5cb6f406b7edee386bfb5a899fa5ae9f24117c4b1fe649286651ece65381'
|
|
'ffffffffffffffff', 16)
|
|
super(KexGroup1, self).__init__('KexGroup1', 'sha1', 2, p)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup14(KexDH): # pragma: nocover
|
|
def __init__(self, hash_alg):
|
|
# type: () -> None
|
|
# rfc3526: 2048-bit modp group
|
|
p = int('ffffffffffffffffc90fdaa22168c234c4c6628b80dc1cd129024e088a67'
|
|
'cc74020bbea63b139b22514a08798e3404ddef9519b3cd3a431b302b0a6d'
|
|
'f25f14374fe1356d6d51c245e485b576625e7ec6f44c42e9a637ed6b0bff'
|
|
'5cb6f406b7edee386bfb5a899fa5ae9f24117c4b1fe649286651ece45b3d'
|
|
'c2007cb8a163bf0598da48361c55d39a69163fa8fd24cf5f83655d23dca3'
|
|
'ad961c62f356208552bb9ed529077096966d670c354e4abc9804f1746c08'
|
|
'ca18217c32905e462e36ce3be39e772c180e86039b2783a2ec07a28fb5c5'
|
|
'5df06f4c52c9de2bcbf6955817183995497cea956ae515d2261898fa0510'
|
|
'15728e5a8aacaa68ffffffffffffffff', 16)
|
|
super(KexGroup14, self).__init__('KexGroup14', hash_alg, 2, p)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup14_SHA1(KexGroup14):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexGroup14_SHA1, self).__init__('sha1')
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup14_SHA256(KexGroup14):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexGroup14_SHA256, self).__init__('sha256')
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup16_SHA512(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
# rfc3526: 4096-bit modp group
|
|
p = int('ffffffffffffffffc90fdaa22168c234c4c6628b80dc1cd129024e088a67'
|
|
'cc74020bbea63b139b22514a08798e3404ddef9519b3cd3a431b302b0a6d'
|
|
'f25f14374fe1356d6d51c245e485b576625e7ec6f44c42e9a637ed6b0bff'
|
|
'5cb6f406b7edee386bfb5a899fa5ae9f24117c4b1fe649286651ece45b3d'
|
|
'c2007cb8a163bf0598da48361c55d39a69163fa8fd24cf5f83655d23dca3'
|
|
'ad961c62f356208552bb9ed529077096966d670c354e4abc9804f1746c08'
|
|
'ca18217c32905e462e36ce3be39e772c180e86039b2783a2ec07a28fb5c5'
|
|
'5df06f4c52c9de2bcbf6955817183995497cea956ae515d2261898fa0510'
|
|
'15728e5a8aaac42dad33170d04507a33a85521abdf1cba64ecfb850458db'
|
|
'ef0a8aea71575d060c7db3970f85a6e1e4c7abf5ae8cdb0933d71e8c94e0'
|
|
'4a25619dcee3d2261ad2ee6bf12ffa06d98a0864d87602733ec86a64521f'
|
|
'2b18177b200cbbe117577a615d6c770988c0bad946e208e24fa074e5ab31'
|
|
'43db5bfce0fd108e4b82d120a92108011a723c12a787e6d788719a10bdba'
|
|
'5b2699c327186af4e23c1a946834b6150bda2583e9ca2ad44ce8dbbbc2db'
|
|
'04de8ef92e8efc141fbecaa6287c59474e6bc05d99b2964fa090c3a2233b'
|
|
'a186515be7ed1f612970cee2d7afb81bdd762170481cd0069127d5b05aa9'
|
|
'93b4ea988d8fddc186ffb7dc90a6c08f4df435c934063199ffffffffffff'
|
|
'ffff', 16)
|
|
super(KexGroup16_SHA512, self).__init__('KexGroup16_SHA512', 'sha512', 2, p)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroup18_SHA512(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
# rfc3526: 8192-bit modp group
|
|
p = int('ffffffffffffffffc90fdaa22168c234c4c6628b80dc1cd129024e088a67'
|
|
'cc74020bbea63b139b22514a08798e3404ddef9519b3cd3a431b302b0a6d'
|
|
'f25f14374fe1356d6d51c245e485b576625e7ec6f44c42e9a637ed6b0bff'
|
|
'5cb6f406b7edee386bfb5a899fa5ae9f24117c4b1fe649286651ece45b3d'
|
|
'c2007cb8a163bf0598da48361c55d39a69163fa8fd24cf5f83655d23dca3'
|
|
'ad961c62f356208552bb9ed529077096966d670c354e4abc9804f1746c08'
|
|
'ca18217c32905e462e36ce3be39e772c180e86039b2783a2ec07a28fb5c5'
|
|
'5df06f4c52c9de2bcbf6955817183995497cea956ae515d2261898fa0510'
|
|
'15728e5a8aaac42dad33170d04507a33a85521abdf1cba64ecfb850458db'
|
|
'ef0a8aea71575d060c7db3970f85a6e1e4c7abf5ae8cdb0933d71e8c94e0'
|
|
'4a25619dcee3d2261ad2ee6bf12ffa06d98a0864d87602733ec86a64521f'
|
|
'2b18177b200cbbe117577a615d6c770988c0bad946e208e24fa074e5ab31'
|
|
'43db5bfce0fd108e4b82d120a92108011a723c12a787e6d788719a10bdba'
|
|
'5b2699c327186af4e23c1a946834b6150bda2583e9ca2ad44ce8dbbbc2db'
|
|
'04de8ef92e8efc141fbecaa6287c59474e6bc05d99b2964fa090c3a2233b'
|
|
'a186515be7ed1f612970cee2d7afb81bdd762170481cd0069127d5b05aa9'
|
|
'93b4ea988d8fddc186ffb7dc90a6c08f4df435c93402849236c3fab4d27c'
|
|
'7026c1d4dcb2602646dec9751e763dba37bdf8ff9406ad9e530ee5db382f'
|
|
'413001aeb06a53ed9027d831179727b0865a8918da3edbebcf9b14ed44ce'
|
|
'6cbaced4bb1bdb7f1447e6cc254b332051512bd7af426fb8f401378cd2bf'
|
|
'5983ca01c64b92ecf032ea15d1721d03f482d7ce6e74fef6d55e702f4698'
|
|
'0c82b5a84031900b1c9e59e7c97fbec7e8f323a97a7e36cc88be0f1d45b7'
|
|
'ff585ac54bd407b22b4154aacc8f6d7ebf48e1d814cc5ed20f8037e0a797'
|
|
'15eef29be32806a1d58bb7c5da76f550aa3d8a1fbff0eb19ccb1a313d55c'
|
|
'da56c9ec2ef29632387fe8d76e3c0468043e8f663f4860ee12bf2d5b0b74'
|
|
'74d6e694f91e6dbe115974a3926f12fee5e438777cb6a932df8cd8bec4d0'
|
|
'73b931ba3bc832b68d9dd300741fa7bf8afc47ed2576f6936ba424663aab'
|
|
'639c5ae4f5683423b4742bf1c978238f16cbe39d652de3fdb8befc848ad9'
|
|
'22222e04a4037c0713eb57a81a23f0c73473fc646cea306b4bcbc8862f83'
|
|
'85ddfa9d4b7fa2c087e879683303ed5bdd3a062b3cf5b3a278a66d2a13f8'
|
|
'3f44f82ddf310ee074ab6a364597e899a0255dc164f31cc50846851df9ab'
|
|
'48195ded7ea1b1d510bd7ee74d73faf36bc31ecfa268359046f4eb879f92'
|
|
'4009438b481c6cd7889a002ed5ee382bc9190da6fc026e479558e4475677'
|
|
'e9aa9e3050e2765694dfc81f56e880b96e7160c980dd98edd3dfffffffff'
|
|
'ffffffff', 16)
|
|
super(KexGroup18_SHA512, self).__init__('KexGroup18_SHA512', 'sha512', 2, p)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexCurve25519_SHA256(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexCurve25519_SHA256, self).__init__('KexCurve25519_SHA256', 'sha256', 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
# To start an ED25519 kex, we simply send a random 256-bit number as the
|
|
# public key.
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT):
|
|
self.__ed25519_pubkey = os.urandom(32)
|
|
s.write_byte(init_msg)
|
|
s.write_string(self.__ed25519_pubkey)
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexNISTP256(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexNISTP256, self).__init__('KexNISTP256', 'sha256', 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
# Because the server checks that the value sent here is valid (i.e.: it lies
|
|
# on the curve, among other things), we would have to write a lot of code
|
|
# or import an elliptic curve library in order to randomly generate a
|
|
# valid elliptic point each time. Hence, we will simply send a static
|
|
# value, which is enough for us to extract the server's host key.
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT):
|
|
s.write_byte(init_msg)
|
|
s.write_string(b'\x04\x0b\x60\x44\x9f\x8a\x11\x9e\xc7\x81\x0c\xa9\x98\xfc\xb7\x90\xaa\x6b\x26\x8c\x12\x4a\xc0\x09\xbb\xdf\xc4\x2c\x4c\x2c\x99\xb6\xe1\x71\xa0\xd4\xb3\x62\x47\x74\xb3\x39\x0c\xf2\x88\x4a\x84\x6b\x3b\x15\x77\xa5\x77\xd2\xa9\xc9\x94\xf9\xd5\x66\x19\xcd\x02\x34\xd1')
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexNISTP384(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexNISTP384, self).__init__('KexNISTP384', 'sha256', 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
# See comment for KexNISTP256.send_init().
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT):
|
|
s.write_byte(init_msg)
|
|
s.write_string(b'\x04\xe2\x9b\x84\xce\xa1\x39\x50\xfe\x1e\xa3\x18\x70\x1c\xe2\x7a\xe4\xb5\x6f\xdf\x93\x9f\xd4\xf4\x08\xcc\x9b\x02\x10\xa4\xca\x77\x9c\x2e\x51\x44\x1d\x50\x7a\x65\x4e\x7e\x2f\x10\x2d\x2d\x4a\x32\xc9\x8e\x18\x75\x90\x6c\x19\x10\xda\xcc\xa8\xe9\xf4\xc4\x3a\x53\x80\x35\xf4\x97\x9c\x04\x16\xf9\x5a\xdc\xcc\x05\x94\x29\xfa\xc4\xd6\x87\x4e\x13\x21\xdb\x3d\x12\xac\xbd\x20\x3b\x60\xff\xe6\x58\x42')
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexNISTP521(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexNISTP521, self).__init__('KexNISTP521', 'sha256', 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
# See comment for KexNISTP256.send_init().
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_INIT):
|
|
s.write_byte(init_msg)
|
|
s.write_string(b'\x04\x01\x02\x90\x29\xe9\x8f\xa8\x04\xaf\x1c\x00\xf9\xc6\x29\xc0\x39\x74\x8e\xea\x47\x7e\x7c\xf7\x15\x6e\x43\x3b\x59\x13\x53\x43\xb0\xae\x0b\xe7\xe6\x7c\x55\x73\x52\xa5\x2a\xc1\x42\xde\xfc\xf4\x1f\x8b\x5a\x8d\xfa\xcd\x0a\x65\x77\xa8\xce\x68\xd2\xc6\x26\xb5\x3f\xee\x4b\x01\x7b\xd2\x96\x23\x69\x53\xc7\x01\xe1\x0d\x39\xe9\x87\x49\x3b\xc8\xec\xda\x0c\xf9\xca\xad\x89\x42\x36\x6f\x93\x78\x78\x31\x55\x51\x09\x51\xc0\x96\xd7\xea\x61\xbf\xc2\x44\x08\x80\x43\xed\xc6\xbb\xfb\x94\xbd\xf8\xdf\x2b\xd8\x0b\x2e\x29\x1b\x8c\xc4\x8a\x04\x2d\x3a')
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroupExchange(KexDH):
|
|
def __init__(self, classname, hash_alg):
|
|
super(KexGroupExchange, self).__init__(classname, hash_alg, 0, 0)
|
|
|
|
def send_init(self, s, init_msg=SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST):
|
|
self.send_init_gex(s)
|
|
|
|
# The group exchange starts with sending a message to the server with
|
|
# the minimum, maximum, and preferred number of bits are for the DH group.
|
|
# The server responds with a generator and prime modulus that matches that,
|
|
# then the handshake continues on like a normal DH handshake (except the
|
|
# SSH message types differ).
|
|
def send_init_gex(self, s, minbits=1024, prefbits=2048, maxbits=8192):
|
|
|
|
# Send the initial group exchange request. Tell the server what range
|
|
# of modulus sizes we will accept, along with our preference.
|
|
s.write_byte(SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST)
|
|
s.write_int(minbits)
|
|
s.write_int(prefbits)
|
|
s.write_int(maxbits)
|
|
s.send_packet()
|
|
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
|
|
if (packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_GROUP) and (packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG):
|
|
# TODO: replace with a better exception type.
|
|
raise Exception('Expected MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY (%d), but got %d instead.' % (SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY, packet_type))
|
|
|
|
# Skip any & all MSG_DEBUG messages.
|
|
while packet_type == SSH.Protocol.MSG_DEBUG:
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(2)
|
|
|
|
# Parse the modulus (p) and generator (g) values from the server.
|
|
ptr = 0
|
|
p_len = struct.unpack('>I', payload[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
|
|
ptr += 4
|
|
|
|
p = int(binascii.hexlify(payload[ptr:ptr + p_len]), 16)
|
|
ptr += p_len
|
|
|
|
g_len = struct.unpack('>I', payload[ptr:ptr + 4])[0]
|
|
ptr += 4
|
|
|
|
g = int(binascii.hexlify(payload[ptr:ptr + g_len]), 16)
|
|
ptr += g_len
|
|
|
|
# Now that we got the generator and modulus, perform the DH exchange
|
|
# like usual.
|
|
super(KexGroupExchange, self).set_params(g, p)
|
|
super(KexGroupExchange, self).send_init(s, SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXDH_GEX_INIT)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroupExchange_SHA1(KexGroupExchange):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexGroupExchange_SHA1, self).__init__('KexGroupExchange_SHA1', 'sha1')
|
|
|
|
|
|
class KexGroupExchange_SHA256(KexGroupExchange):
|
|
def __init__(self):
|
|
super(KexGroupExchange_SHA256, self).__init__('KexGroupExchange_SHA256', 'sha256')
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_algorithms(title, alg_db, alg_type, algorithms, unknown_algs, maxlen=0, alg_sizes=None):
|
|
# type: (str, Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]], str, List[text_type], int) -> None
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
for algorithm in algorithms:
|
|
output_algorithm(alg_db, alg_type, algorithm, unknown_algs, maxlen, alg_sizes)
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
out.head('# ' + title)
|
|
obuf.flush()
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_algorithm(alg_db, alg_type, alg_name, unknown_algs, alg_max_len=0, alg_sizes=None):
|
|
# type: (Dict[str, Dict[str, List[List[Optional[str]]]]], str, text_type, int) -> None
|
|
prefix = '(' + alg_type + ') '
|
|
if alg_max_len == 0:
|
|
alg_max_len = len(alg_name)
|
|
padding = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (alg_max_len - len(alg_name))
|
|
|
|
# If this is an RSA host key or DH GEX, append the size to its name and fix
|
|
# the padding.
|
|
alg_name_with_size = None
|
|
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (alg_name in alg_sizes):
|
|
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[alg_name]
|
|
if ca_size > 0:
|
|
alg_name_with_size = '%s (%d-bit cert/%d-bit CA)' % (alg_name, hostkey_size, ca_size)
|
|
padding = padding[0:-15]
|
|
else:
|
|
alg_name_with_size = '%s (%d-bit)' % (alg_name, hostkey_size)
|
|
padding = padding[0:-11]
|
|
|
|
texts = []
|
|
if len(alg_name.strip()) == 0:
|
|
return
|
|
alg_name_native = utils.to_ntext(alg_name)
|
|
if alg_name_native in alg_db[alg_type]:
|
|
alg_desc = alg_db[alg_type][alg_name_native]
|
|
ldesc = len(alg_desc)
|
|
for idx, level in enumerate(['fail', 'warn', 'info']):
|
|
if level == 'info':
|
|
versions = alg_desc[0]
|
|
since_text = SSH.Algorithm.get_since_text(versions)
|
|
if since_text is not None and len(since_text) > 0:
|
|
texts.append((level, since_text))
|
|
idx = idx + 1
|
|
if ldesc > idx:
|
|
for t in alg_desc[idx]:
|
|
if t is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
texts.append((level, t))
|
|
if len(texts) == 0:
|
|
texts.append(('info', ''))
|
|
else:
|
|
texts.append(('warn', 'unknown algorithm'))
|
|
unknown_algs.append(alg_name)
|
|
|
|
alg_name = alg_name_with_size if alg_name_with_size is not None else alg_name
|
|
first = True
|
|
for level, text in texts:
|
|
f = getattr(out, level)
|
|
comment = (padding + ' -- [' + level + '] ' + text) if text != '' else ''
|
|
if first:
|
|
if first and level == 'info':
|
|
f = out.good
|
|
f(prefix + alg_name + comment)
|
|
first = False
|
|
else: # pylint: disable=else-if-used
|
|
if out.verbose:
|
|
f(prefix + alg_name + comment)
|
|
elif text != '':
|
|
comment = (padding + ' `- [' + level + '] ' + text)
|
|
f(' ' * len(prefix + alg_name) + comment)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_compatibility(algs, client_audit, for_server=True):
|
|
# type: (SSH.Algorithms, bool) -> None
|
|
|
|
# Don't output any compatibility info if we're doing a client audit.
|
|
if client_audit:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
ssh_timeframe = algs.get_ssh_timeframe(for_server)
|
|
comp_text = []
|
|
for ssh_prod in [SSH.Product.OpenSSH, SSH.Product.DropbearSSH]:
|
|
if ssh_prod not in ssh_timeframe:
|
|
continue
|
|
v_from = ssh_timeframe.get_from(ssh_prod, for_server)
|
|
v_till = ssh_timeframe.get_till(ssh_prod, for_server)
|
|
if v_from is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
if v_till is None:
|
|
comp_text.append('{0} {1}+'.format(ssh_prod, v_from))
|
|
elif v_from == v_till:
|
|
comp_text.append('{0} {1}'.format(ssh_prod, v_from))
|
|
else:
|
|
software = SSH.Software(None, ssh_prod, v_from, None, None)
|
|
if software.compare_version(v_till) > 0:
|
|
tfmt = '{0} {1}+ (some functionality from {2})'
|
|
else:
|
|
tfmt = '{0} {1}-{2}'
|
|
comp_text.append(tfmt.format(ssh_prod, v_from, v_till))
|
|
if len(comp_text) > 0:
|
|
out.good('(gen) compatibility: ' + ', '.join(comp_text))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_security_sub(sub, software, client_audit, padlen):
|
|
# type: (str, Optional[SSH.Software], int) -> None
|
|
secdb = SSH.Security.CVE if sub == 'cve' else SSH.Security.TXT
|
|
if software is None or software.product not in secdb:
|
|
return
|
|
for line in secdb[software.product]:
|
|
vfrom, vtill = line[0:2] # type: str, str
|
|
if not software.between_versions(vfrom, vtill):
|
|
continue
|
|
target, name = line[2:4] # type: int, str
|
|
is_server = target & 1 == 1
|
|
is_client = target & 2 == 2
|
|
# is_local = target & 4 == 4
|
|
|
|
# If this security entry applies only to servers, but we're testing a client, then skip it. Similarly, skip entries that apply only to clients, but we're testing a server.
|
|
if (is_server and not is_client and client_audit) or (is_client and not is_server and not client_audit):
|
|
continue
|
|
p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
|
|
if sub == 'cve':
|
|
cvss, descr = line[4:6] # type: float, str
|
|
|
|
# Critical CVSS scores (>= 8.0) are printed as a fail, otherwise they are printed as a warning.
|
|
out_func = out.warn
|
|
if cvss >= 8.0:
|
|
out_func = out.fail
|
|
out_func('(cve) {0}{1} -- (CVSSv2: {2}) {3}'.format(name, p, cvss, descr))
|
|
else:
|
|
descr = line[4]
|
|
out.fail('(sec) {0}{1} -- {2}'.format(name, p, descr))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_security(banner, client_audit, padlen):
|
|
# type: (Optional[SSH.Banner], int) -> None
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
if banner is not None:
|
|
software = SSH.Software.parse(banner)
|
|
output_security_sub('cve', software, client_audit, padlen)
|
|
output_security_sub('txt', software, client_audit, padlen)
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
out.head('# security')
|
|
obuf.flush()
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output_fingerprints(algs, sha256=True):
|
|
# type: (SSH.Algorithms, bool, int) -> None
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
fps = []
|
|
if algs.ssh1kex is not None:
|
|
name = 'ssh-rsa1'
|
|
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(algs.ssh1kex.host_key_fingerprint_data)
|
|
#bits = algs.ssh1kex.host_key_bits
|
|
fps.append((name, fp))
|
|
if algs.ssh2kex is not None:
|
|
host_keys = algs.ssh2kex.host_keys()
|
|
for host_key_type in algs.ssh2kex.host_keys():
|
|
if host_keys[host_key_type] is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(host_keys[host_key_type])
|
|
|
|
# Workaround for Python's order-indifference in dicts. We might get a random RSA type (ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, or rsa-sha2-512), so running the tool against the same server three times may give three different host key types here. So if we have any RSA type, we will simply hard-code it to 'ssh-rsa'.
|
|
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
host_key_type = 'ssh-rsa'
|
|
|
|
# Skip over certificate host types (or we would return invalid fingerprints).
|
|
if '-cert-' not in host_key_type:
|
|
fps.append((host_key_type, fp))
|
|
# Similarly, the host keys can be processed in random order due to Python's order-indifference in dicts. So we sort this list before printing; this makes automated testing possible.
|
|
fps = sorted(fps)
|
|
for fpp in fps:
|
|
name, fp = fpp
|
|
fpo = fp.sha256 if sha256 else fp.md5
|
|
#p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
|
|
#out.good('(fin) {0}{1} -- {2} {3}'.format(name, p, bits, fpo))
|
|
out.good('(fin) {0}: {1}'.format(name, fpo))
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
out.head('# fingerprints')
|
|
obuf.flush()
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Returns True if no warnings or failures encountered in configuration.
|
|
def output_recommendations(algs, software, padlen=0):
|
|
# type: (SSH.Algorithms, Optional[SSH.Software], int) -> None
|
|
|
|
ret = True
|
|
# PuTTY's algorithms cannot be modified, so there's no point in issuing recommendations.
|
|
if (software is not None) and (software.product == SSH.Product.PuTTY):
|
|
max_vuln_version = 0.0
|
|
max_cvssv2_severity = 0.0
|
|
# Search the CVE database for the most recent vulnerable version and the max CVSSv2 score.
|
|
for cve_list in SSH.Security.CVE['PuTTY']:
|
|
vuln_version = float(cve_list[1])
|
|
cvssv2_severity = cve_list[4]
|
|
|
|
if vuln_version > max_vuln_version:
|
|
max_vuln_version = vuln_version
|
|
if cvssv2_severity > max_cvssv2_severity:
|
|
max_cvssv2_severity = cvssv2_severity
|
|
|
|
fn = out.warn
|
|
if max_cvssv2_severity > 8.0:
|
|
fn = out.fail
|
|
|
|
# Assuming that PuTTY versions will always increment by 0.01, we can calculate the first safe version by adding 0.01 to the latest vulnerable version.
|
|
current_version = float(software.version)
|
|
upgrade_to_version = max_vuln_version + 0.01
|
|
if current_version < upgrade_to_version:
|
|
out.head('# recommendations')
|
|
fn('(rec) Upgrade to PuTTY v%.2f' % upgrade_to_version)
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
ret = False
|
|
return ret
|
|
|
|
for_server = True
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
software, alg_rec = algs.get_recommendations(software, for_server)
|
|
for sshv in range(2, 0, -1):
|
|
if sshv not in alg_rec:
|
|
continue
|
|
for alg_type in ['kex', 'key', 'enc', 'mac']:
|
|
if alg_type not in alg_rec[sshv]:
|
|
continue
|
|
for action in ['del', 'add', 'chg']:
|
|
if action not in alg_rec[sshv][alg_type]:
|
|
continue
|
|
for name in alg_rec[sshv][alg_type][action]:
|
|
p = '' if out.batch else ' ' * (padlen - len(name))
|
|
chg_additional_info = ''
|
|
if action == 'del':
|
|
an, sg, fn = 'remove', '-', out.warn
|
|
ret = False
|
|
if alg_rec[sshv][alg_type][action][name] >= 10:
|
|
fn = out.fail
|
|
elif action == 'add':
|
|
an, sg, fn = 'append', '+', out.good
|
|
elif action == 'chg':
|
|
an, sg, fn = 'change', '!', out.fail
|
|
ret = False
|
|
chg_additional_info = ' (increase modulus size to 2048 bits or larger)'
|
|
b = '(SSH{0})'.format(sshv) if sshv == 1 else ''
|
|
fm = '(rec) {0}{1}{2}-- {3} algorithm to {4}{5} {6}'
|
|
fn(fm.format(sg, name, p, alg_type, an, chg_additional_info, b))
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
if software is not None:
|
|
title = '(for {0})'.format(software.display(False))
|
|
else:
|
|
title = ''
|
|
out.head('# algorithm recommendations {0}'.format(title))
|
|
obuf.flush(True) # Sort the output so that it is always stable (needed for repeatable testing).
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
return ret
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Output additional information & notes.
|
|
def output_info(algs, software, client_audit, any_problems, padlen=0):
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
# Tell user that PuTTY cannot be hardened at the protocol-level.
|
|
if client_audit and (software is not None) and (software.product == SSH.Product.PuTTY):
|
|
out.warn('(nfo) PuTTY does not have the option of restricting any algorithms during the SSH handshake.')
|
|
|
|
# If any warnings or failures were given, print a link to the hardening guides.
|
|
if any_problems:
|
|
out.warn('(nfo) For hardening guides on common OSes, please see: <https://www.ssh-audit.com/hardening_guides.html>')
|
|
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
out.head('# additional info')
|
|
obuf.flush()
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def output(banner, header, client_host=None, kex=None, pkm=None):
|
|
# type: (Optional[SSH.Banner], List[text_type], Optional[SSH2.Kex], Optional[SSH1.PublicKeyMessage]) -> None
|
|
client_audit = (client_host != None) # If set, this is a client audit.
|
|
sshv = 1 if pkm is not None else 2
|
|
algs = SSH.Algorithms(pkm, kex)
|
|
with OutputBuffer() as obuf:
|
|
if client_audit:
|
|
out.good('(gen) client IP: {0}'.format(client_host))
|
|
if len(header) > 0:
|
|
out.info('(gen) header: ' + '\n'.join(header))
|
|
if banner is not None:
|
|
out.good('(gen) banner: {0}'.format(banner))
|
|
if not banner.valid_ascii:
|
|
# NOTE: RFC 4253, Section 4.2
|
|
out.warn('(gen) banner contains non-printable ASCII')
|
|
if sshv == 1 or banner.protocol[0] == 1:
|
|
out.fail('(gen) protocol SSH1 enabled')
|
|
software = SSH.Software.parse(banner)
|
|
if software is not None:
|
|
out.good('(gen) software: {0}'.format(software))
|
|
else:
|
|
software = None
|
|
output_compatibility(algs, client_audit)
|
|
if kex is not None:
|
|
compressions = [x for x in kex.server.compression if x != 'none']
|
|
if len(compressions) > 0:
|
|
cmptxt = 'enabled ({0})'.format(', '.join(compressions))
|
|
else:
|
|
cmptxt = 'disabled'
|
|
out.good('(gen) compression: {0}'.format(cmptxt))
|
|
if len(obuf) > 0:
|
|
out.head('# general')
|
|
obuf.flush()
|
|
out.sep()
|
|
maxlen = algs.maxlen + 1
|
|
output_security(banner, client_audit, maxlen)
|
|
unknown_algorithms = [] # Filled in by output_algorithms() with unidentified algs.
|
|
if pkm is not None:
|
|
adb = SSH1.KexDB.ALGORITHMS
|
|
ciphers = pkm.supported_ciphers
|
|
auths = pkm.supported_authentications
|
|
title, atype = 'SSH1 host-key algorithms', 'key'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, ['ssh-rsa1'], unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
|
|
title, atype = 'SSH1 encryption algorithms (ciphers)', 'enc'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, ciphers, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
|
|
title, atype = 'SSH1 authentication types', 'aut'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, auths, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
|
|
if kex is not None:
|
|
adb = SSH2.KexDB.ALGORITHMS
|
|
title, atype = 'key exchange algorithms', 'kex'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.kex_algorithms, unknown_algorithms, maxlen, kex.dh_modulus_sizes())
|
|
title, atype = 'host-key algorithms', 'key'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.key_algorithms, unknown_algorithms, maxlen, kex.rsa_key_sizes())
|
|
title, atype = 'encryption algorithms (ciphers)', 'enc'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.server.encryption, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
|
|
title, atype = 'message authentication code algorithms', 'mac'
|
|
output_algorithms(title, adb, atype, kex.server.mac, unknown_algorithms, maxlen)
|
|
output_fingerprints(algs, True)
|
|
perfect_config = output_recommendations(algs, software, maxlen)
|
|
output_info(algs, software, client_audit, not perfect_config)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If we encountered any unknown algorithms, ask the user to report them.
|
|
if len(unknown_algorithms) > 0:
|
|
out.warn("\n\n!!! WARNING: unknown algorithm(s) found!: %s. Please email the full output above to the maintainer (jtesta@positronsecurity.com), or create a Github issue at <https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/issues>.\n" % ','.join(unknown_algorithms))
|
|
|
|
class Utils(object):
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _type_err(cls, v, target):
|
|
# type: (Any, text_type) -> TypeError
|
|
return TypeError('cannot convert {0} to {1}'.format(type(v), target))
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def to_bytes(cls, v, enc='utf-8'):
|
|
# type: (Union[binary_type, text_type], str) -> binary_type
|
|
if isinstance(v, binary_type):
|
|
return v
|
|
elif isinstance(v, text_type):
|
|
return v.encode(enc)
|
|
raise cls._type_err(v, 'bytes')
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def to_utext(cls, v, enc='utf-8'):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, binary_type], str) -> text_type
|
|
if isinstance(v, text_type):
|
|
return v
|
|
elif isinstance(v, binary_type):
|
|
return v.decode(enc)
|
|
raise cls._type_err(v, 'unicode text')
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def to_ntext(cls, v, enc='utf-8'):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, binary_type], str) -> str
|
|
if isinstance(v, str):
|
|
return v
|
|
elif isinstance(v, text_type):
|
|
return v.encode(enc) # PY2 only
|
|
elif isinstance(v, binary_type):
|
|
return v.decode(enc) # PY3 only
|
|
raise cls._type_err(v, 'native text')
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _is_ascii(cls, v, char_filter=lambda x: x <= 127):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str], Callable[[int], bool]) -> bool
|
|
r = False
|
|
if isinstance(v, (text_type, str)):
|
|
for c in v:
|
|
i = cls.ctoi(c)
|
|
if not char_filter(i):
|
|
return r
|
|
r = True
|
|
return r
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def _to_ascii(cls, v, char_filter=lambda x: x <= 127, errors='replace'):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str], Callable[[int], bool], str) -> str
|
|
if isinstance(v, (text_type, str)):
|
|
r = bytearray()
|
|
for c in v:
|
|
i = cls.ctoi(c)
|
|
if char_filter(i):
|
|
r.append(i)
|
|
else:
|
|
if errors == 'ignore':
|
|
continue
|
|
r.append(63)
|
|
return cls.to_ntext(r.decode('ascii'))
|
|
raise cls._type_err(v, 'ascii')
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def is_ascii(cls, v):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str]) -> bool
|
|
return cls._is_ascii(v)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def to_ascii(cls, v, errors='replace'):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str], str) -> str
|
|
return cls._to_ascii(v, errors=errors)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def is_print_ascii(cls, v):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str]) -> bool
|
|
return cls._is_ascii(v, lambda x: x >= 32 and x <= 126)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def to_print_ascii(cls, v, errors='replace'):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str], str) -> str
|
|
return cls._to_ascii(v, lambda x: x >= 32 and x <= 126, errors)
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def unique_seq(cls, seq):
|
|
# type: (Sequence[Any]) -> Sequence[Any]
|
|
seen = set() # type: Set[Any]
|
|
|
|
def _seen_add(x):
|
|
# type: (Any) -> bool
|
|
seen.add(x)
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(seq, tuple):
|
|
return tuple(x for x in seq if x not in seen and not _seen_add(x))
|
|
else:
|
|
return [x for x in seq if x not in seen and not _seen_add(x)]
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def ctoi(cls, c):
|
|
# type: (Union[text_type, str, int]) -> int
|
|
if isinstance(c, (text_type, str)):
|
|
return ord(c[0])
|
|
else:
|
|
return c
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def parse_int(v):
|
|
# type: (Any) -> int
|
|
try:
|
|
return int(v)
|
|
except: # pylint: disable=bare-except
|
|
return 0
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def parse_float(v):
|
|
# type: (Any) -> float
|
|
try:
|
|
return float(v)
|
|
except: # pylint: disable=bare-except
|
|
return -1.0
|
|
|
|
def build_struct(banner, kex=None, pkm=None, client_host=None):
|
|
res = {
|
|
"banner": {
|
|
"raw": str(banner),
|
|
"protocol": banner.protocol,
|
|
"software": banner.software,
|
|
"comments": banner.comments,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if client_host is not None:
|
|
res['client_ip'] = client_host
|
|
if kex is not None:
|
|
res['compression'] = kex.server.compression
|
|
|
|
res['kex'] = []
|
|
alg_sizes = kex.dh_modulus_sizes()
|
|
for algorithm in kex.kex_algorithms:
|
|
entry = {
|
|
'algorithm': algorithm,
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (algorithm in alg_sizes):
|
|
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[algorithm]
|
|
entry['keysize'] = hostkey_size
|
|
if ca_size > 0:
|
|
entry['casize'] = ca_size
|
|
res['kex'].append(entry)
|
|
|
|
res['key'] = []
|
|
alg_sizes = kex.rsa_key_sizes()
|
|
for algorithm in kex.key_algorithms:
|
|
entry = {
|
|
'algorithm': algorithm,
|
|
}
|
|
if (alg_sizes is not None) and (algorithm in alg_sizes):
|
|
hostkey_size, ca_size = alg_sizes[algorithm]
|
|
entry['keysize'] = hostkey_size
|
|
if ca_size > 0:
|
|
entry['casize'] = ca_size
|
|
res['key'].append(entry)
|
|
|
|
res['enc'] = kex.server.encryption
|
|
res['mac'] = kex.server.mac
|
|
res['fingerprints'] = []
|
|
host_keys = kex.host_keys()
|
|
|
|
# Normalize all RSA key types to 'ssh-rsa'. Otherwise, due to Python's order-indifference dictionary types, we would iterate key types in unpredictable orders, which interferes with the docker testing framework (i.e.: tests would fail because elements are reported out of order, even though the output is semantically the same).
|
|
for host_key_type in host_keys.keys():
|
|
if host_key_type in SSH2.HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
|
|
val = host_keys[host_key_type]
|
|
del(host_keys[host_key_type])
|
|
host_keys['ssh-rsa'] = val
|
|
|
|
for host_key_type in sorted(host_keys):
|
|
if host_keys[host_key_type] is None:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
fp = SSH.Fingerprint(host_keys[host_key_type])
|
|
|
|
# Skip over certificate host types (or we would return invalid fingerprints).
|
|
if '-cert-' in host_key_type:
|
|
continue
|
|
entry = {
|
|
'type': host_key_type,
|
|
'fp': fp.sha256,
|
|
}
|
|
res['fingerprints'].append(entry)
|
|
else:
|
|
res['key'] = ['ssh-rsa1']
|
|
res['enc'] = pkm.supported_ciphers
|
|
res['aut'] = pkm.supported_authentications
|
|
res['fingerprints'] = [{
|
|
'type': 'ssh-rsa1',
|
|
'fp': SSH.Fingerprint(pkm.host_key_fingerprint_data).sha256,
|
|
}]
|
|
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
def audit(aconf, sshv=None):
|
|
# type: (AuditConf, Optional[int]) -> None
|
|
out.batch = aconf.batch
|
|
out.verbose = aconf.verbose
|
|
out.level = aconf.level
|
|
out.use_colors = aconf.colors
|
|
s = SSH.Socket(aconf.host, aconf.port, aconf.ipvo, aconf.timeout, aconf.timeout_set)
|
|
if aconf.client_audit:
|
|
s.listen_and_accept()
|
|
else:
|
|
s.connect()
|
|
if sshv is None:
|
|
sshv = 2 if aconf.ssh2 else 1
|
|
err = None
|
|
banner, header, err = s.get_banner(sshv)
|
|
if banner is None:
|
|
if err is None:
|
|
err = '[exception] did not receive banner.'
|
|
else:
|
|
err = '[exception] did not receive banner: {0}'.format(err)
|
|
if err is None:
|
|
packet_type, payload = s.read_packet(sshv)
|
|
if packet_type < 0:
|
|
try:
|
|
if payload is not None and len(payload) > 0:
|
|
payload_txt = payload.decode('utf-8')
|
|
else:
|
|
payload_txt = u'empty'
|
|
except UnicodeDecodeError:
|
|
payload_txt = u'"{0}"'.format(repr(payload).lstrip('b')[1:-1])
|
|
if payload_txt == u'Protocol major versions differ.':
|
|
if sshv == 2 and aconf.ssh1:
|
|
audit(aconf, 1)
|
|
return
|
|
err = '[exception] error reading packet ({0})'.format(payload_txt)
|
|
else:
|
|
err_pair = None
|
|
if sshv == 1 and packet_type != SSH.Protocol.SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
err_pair = ('SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY', SSH.Protocol.SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY)
|
|
elif sshv == 2 and packet_type != SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT:
|
|
err_pair = ('MSG_KEXINIT', SSH.Protocol.MSG_KEXINIT)
|
|
if err_pair is not None:
|
|
fmt = '[exception] did not receive {0} ({1}), ' + \
|
|
'instead received unknown message ({2})'
|
|
err = fmt.format(err_pair[0], err_pair[1], packet_type)
|
|
if err is not None:
|
|
output(banner, header)
|
|
out.fail(err)
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
if sshv == 1:
|
|
pkm = SSH1.PublicKeyMessage.parse(payload)
|
|
if aconf.json:
|
|
print(json.dumps(build_struct(banner, pkm=pkm), sort_keys=True))
|
|
else:
|
|
output(banner, header, pkm=pkm)
|
|
elif sshv == 2:
|
|
kex = SSH2.Kex.parse(payload)
|
|
if aconf.client_audit is False:
|
|
SSH2.HostKeyTest.run(s, kex)
|
|
SSH2.GEXTest.run(s, kex)
|
|
if aconf.json:
|
|
print(json.dumps(build_struct(banner, kex=kex, client_host=s.client_host), sort_keys=True))
|
|
else:
|
|
output(banner, header, client_host=s.client_host, kex=kex)
|
|
|
|
|
|
utils = Utils()
|
|
out = Output()
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
conf = AuditConf.from_cmdline(sys.argv[1:], usage)
|
|
audit(conf)
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__': # pragma: nocover
|
|
main()
|