Fixed parsing of ecdsa-sha2-nistp* CA signatures on host keys. Additionally, they are now flagged as potentially back-doored, just as standard host keys are. (#239)

This commit is contained in:
Joe Testa
2024-02-16 21:58:51 -05:00
parent f326d58068
commit 73b669b49d
3 changed files with 15 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ class HostKeyTest:
hostkey_min_good = 256
hostkey_min_warn = 224
hostkey_warn_str = HostKeyTest.SMALL_ECC_MODULUS_WARNING
if ca_key_type.startswith('ssh-ed25519') or host_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
if ca_key_type.startswith('ssh-ed25519') or ca_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
cakey_min_good = 256
cakey_min_warn = 224
cakey_warn_str = HostKeyTest.SMALL_ECC_MODULUS_WARNING
@@ -209,6 +209,10 @@ class HostKeyTest:
elif (0 < ca_modulus_size < cakey_min_good) and (cakey_warn_str not in key_warn_comments):
key_warn_comments.append(cakey_warn_str)
# If the CA key type uses ECDSA with a NIST P-curve, fail it for possibly being back-doored.
if ca_key_type.startswith('ecdsa-sha2-nistp'):
key_fail_comments.append('CA key uses elliptic curves that are suspected as being backdoored by the U.S. National Security Agency')
# If this host key type is in the RSA family, then mark them all as parsed (since results in one are valid for them all).
if host_key_type in HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY:
for rsa_type in HostKeyTest.RSA_FAMILY: